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Reconfigured Inequality in Modern
Payment Card Networks
Stephen Wilks*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines two phenomena contributing to the racial
stratification of consumers in credit card markets. The first phenomenon pertains to the longstanding conflict between card issuers and merchants over payment processing cost allocation. If
successful, First Amendment challenges to existing statutory
surcharge bans will allow merchants to impose an additional fee
when consumers use credit cards as a form of payment. The Article relies on the interplay between socioeconomic class and behavioral theory to suggest subsistence borrowers would be more
likely to pay surcharge fees than wealthier consumers. This arrangement disfavors the poor to support a hierarchy of borrowers, to the extent that income inequality continues to cleave
along racial lines. The second phenomenon concerns algorithmic
lending practices. Algorithmic lending practices use technology
to effectively extend structural racism’s cumulative effects into
the underwriting process. This Article argues that the al* Visiting Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
B.A., J.D., Queen’s University at Kingston (Canada); M.S.W., University of Toronto; and LL.M., Ph.D., York University, Osgoode Hall Law School (Canada).
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gorithmic lending in modern credit card enrollment practices
supports new and complex iterations of racial bias. Structural racism’s legacy married to modern data mining practices capture
and compare the broad sweep of spending patterns among consumers with racially disparate spending power. Public law’s relationship to each of these two phenomena illustrates the
government’s limited capacity to protect marginalized consumers
from the racialized effects of cardholder stratification. The Article concludes by encouraging experts to refine underwriting practices to disentangle racism’s moral hazards from the legitimate
business practice of equitable underwriting that determines a
prospective borrower’s creditworthiness.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that a
New York statute prohibiting merchants from imposing credit card
surcharges regulated communication and therefore implicated free
speech.1 The Court stopped short of striking down the legislation
and remanded the case back to the Second Circuit. Appellate treatment of similar challenges originating in Texas, Florida, and California, however, suggest that the courts will soon strike down these
statutes for violating the First Amendment.
The circuit court rulings and Supreme Court remand are the
latest development in an industry where two discrete forces will
likely shape cardholder segmentation in the future. The rulings will
likely reinforce economic arrangements that favor top-tier “lifestyle” borrowers to the detriment of poorer cardholders who are
more likely to be “subsistence” borrowers.
The first development shaping cardholder segmentation
originates from surcharges. Surcharges are fees merchants impose
when consumers use credit cards as forms of payment. This Article
posits that surcharges will dissuade card usage among affluent consumers while exploiting vulnerable subsistence borrowers.
Surcharges exploit subsistence borrowers because such cardholders
are more likely to generate revenue for lenders through interest on
unpaid balances and penalties. Recent appellate jurisprudence suggests statutory surcharge bans are not likely to survive First
Amendment challenges. Such challenges are a new phase in the
decades-long contest over fees charged to process credit card payments. Much of the dispute about credit card payment fees turns
on the ratio of payment fees to infrastructure costs related to capturing cashless payments. The dispute further turns on the degree
to which merchants benefit from payment card associations that
work through constituent financial associations. The benefit occurs
when the constituent financial institution underwrites credit card issuance used to support consumer spending. The dispute about how
and which payments go to whom and when is coming to a head in
the application of First Amendment jurisprudence to surcharge
fees.
Increased credit and debit card use—which now exceeds cash,
checks, and other payment methods—sharpens commercial interest
in various differential pricing strategies. Differential pricing refers
to the practice of selling the same product to different customers at
different prices. Differential pricing strategies have been subject to
1. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017).
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complex legal and economic restraints. Most of us can discern how
and why differential pricing psychologically steers a consumer’s
choice of payment. We give less thought, however, to the ways in
which such choices foreclose access to protections afforded by federal law, or to the myriad benefits associated with maintaining active credit relationships. When we infuse the implications of
differential pricing schemes with concern for the experience of racial minorities, the discussion becomes more complex. Pre-existing
forms of racism already extant within debtor-creditor relationships
overlap with payment choice determinants. The intersection of
payment choice determinants and racism embedded in the borrowing system adds distinct racialized implications to differential pricing schemes.
How the legal system treats payment choices and systems has
dramatic impacts on our society. Payment choice matters because
it animates our economic participation in society and supports
movement through the financial system. Payment choice serves as
the vehicle that private individuals and commercial actors use to
pursue their aspirations, meet basic needs, and establish relationships in every interaction requiring tender of payment. Further,
payment choice matters because a study of payment choice reveals
practices that amplify inequities experienced by racial and other minorities. First Amendment protections for differential pricing regimes merely shift control over the mechanisms that shape
consumer behavior. First Amendment litigation posture signals a
potential collision of constitutionally protected commercial speech
with federal consumer protections for credit card users. Additionally, First Amendment protection poses an ethical dilemma for
many socially conscious consumers. Socially conscious consumers
often understand that card-user segmentation inevitably involves
conferral of benefits to some at the expense of others. Finally, First
Amendment protection for differential pricing regimes may enable
merchants to reinforce the marginalization of unbanked and underbanked populations—a constituency whose ranks are predominantly poor and people of color.
The second major industry development revolves around issuer
dependency on algorithms in marketing and enrollment practices.
This Article explores how algorithmic lending practices operate to
include class and race in determinations of creditworthiness. Fair
lending laws cannot easily reach racially problematic lending arrangements when obscured by algorithms. A critique of fair lending laws must also consider whether it is possible to disentangle
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high-risk borrower identification, which is a legitimate business
practice, from implicit bias and other moral hazards.
Payment environments are networked ecologies in which participant behavior shapes the relationships that actors have with
each other, while influencing the payment system architecture as a
whole. The granular details of participant behavior belie important
revelations about the modern marketplace for financial services,
which can be a cruel place for those who are unwittingly complicit
in undermining their own interests. Scholars have historically used
structural racism and its effects to explain how credit card industry
practices produce racially problematic outcomes. This Article seeks
to carve out room to adopt new and complementary analytical approaches better suited to capturing the modern marketplace’s racially problematic effects.
Often institutional in form and function, structural racism is a
system of policies, practices, cultural representations, and other
norms that work to initiate, perpetuate, or reinforce racial group
inequities. Structural racism’s intentional and implicit biases animate and preserve features of socioeconomic stratification and disproportionately impact people of color. These biases reinforce the
notion that people of color’s standing in society can be diminished
and misattributed to their race in isolation of more relevant discriminatory antecedents. The historical arc of racism’s legacy connects widely known historical wrongs to the demographic markers
shaping contemporary access to credit—namely, education, employment, and earning power.
Although helpful, the structural approach’s underlying rubric
is not sufficiently equipped to discuss the card industry’s racially
harmful practices. These practices marry two discrete informational realities. The first reality pertains to traditional demographic
indices like zip codes. Traditional demographic indices commonly
serve as resultant proxies for race because they flow from access to
education, income, employment, and the long-term legacy of redlining and restrictive covenants. The second, and equally insidious, set
of norms takes root in actuarial science, algorithms, and “Big
Data.” These mathematical informational norms complement
traditional markers by pairing traditional markers with powerful
tools designed to target consumers and prey on their economic anxieties. The tools employ behavioral psychology as part of an effort
to promote card usage. The coupling of the traditional and the
technological offers the potential to germinate a new, participatory,
and atomized species of racism. Facially neutral technologies (1)
obscure modern iterations of racial bias, and (2) encourage us to
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unwittingly enable problematic business processes whenever we opt
to pay with cards that feed data-driven expressions of racial harm.
Two features of the credit card industry lend themselves to a
conceptualization of race that is more atomized than structural.
The first feature is statutory in nature. In 1974, Congress enacted
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),2 which was the first
major statutory attempt to regulate determinations of creditworthiness. ECOA sought to regulate determinations of creditworthiness
through forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex and marital
status.3 Congress amended the statute in 1976, adding age, religion,
race, color, and national origin as protected classes.4 Although
ECOA is the primary federal statute barring racial discrimination in
the credit card industry, card issuers are not mandated to capture
and report data on the role race plays in marketing, enrollment, and
underwriting. The gap in card-issuer-discrimination regulation differs from other similar anti-discrimination financial statutes, such as
the statutes that govern anti-discrimination in the mortgage industry. The anti-discrimination obligation of residential mortgage
lenders, for example, has been to report on the race of applicants
and borrowers since 1989.5
The lack of reporting obligations is ironic partially because the
credit card industry is so deeply embedded in the exploitation of
old and new forms of racially problematic data gathering. Yet,
there may be a functional explanation. Consumers buy homes less
frequently than they use credit cards. The frequency of small credit
card purchases makes card use a more transaction-intensive form of
borrowing compared to home loans, which support homeownership
and community development. Regulating the latter form of loan is
tightly intertwined with policy goals that combat the lasting effects
of redlining and other intentionally racist processes. The relatively
small number of mortgage transactions combined with their qualitatively distinct features therefore lends themselves to existing raceconscious reporting requirements.
2. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018).
3. See id. §§ 1521–1522.
4. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2811
(2018). The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act’s underlying policy rationale was to
mandate disclosure of lending practices in urban areas. Since its enactment in
1975, subsequent amendments have expanded the scope of these reporting requirements to include race, gender, and income of applicants and borrowers as
well as pricing data. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 1211(a)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (2018).
5. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801(b), 2802(a)–(b), 2803(b)(4).
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If we articulate racism as an atomized, participatory phenomenon rather than a structural one, we can start thinking about how to
capture the effect of technology’s fusion with actuarial metrics.
This fusion informs a second feature of the card industry: the theory of network effects. The network effects theory rationalizes the
fee structures that allocate card-system costs among consumers,
merchants, and financial institutions. As discussed in Part I, apologists for the current interchange fee system consider this allocation
necessary in two-sided markets where mutual benefits somehow
arise from unequal cost sharing. The industry uses network effects
to articulate cardholders’ relationships with merchants, rather than
the relationships and effects card-using consumers have with each
other. When we understand racism’s effects as originating from
widely dispersed processes, we also have a better framework for
describing how ostensibly neutral lending technologies rely on demographic proxies for race. The same “neutral” lending technologies
place prospective cardholders into a stratified transactional arena.
This stratification compounds existing inequalities through steering
advantages toward premium consumers at the expense of those
who are less affluent and more likely to be people of color.
A large body of scholarship discusses the “payment wars” between payment card networks and merchants,6 the allocation of
benefits arising from interchange fees,7 the advent of algorithmic
lending,8 and the effect of structural inequities within the credit
6. See generally Steven Semeraro, Settlement Without Consent: Assessing the
Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186 (2015);
Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card
Transactions, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 343 (2009); Adam J. Levitin, The
Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment Systems, 17 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 73 (2006).
7. See Steven Semeraro, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Credit Card Rewards: A Response to Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments?
Theory and Calibrations, 25 CONSUMER L. REV. 30 (2012); Steven Semeraro, The
Economic Benefits of Credit Card Merchant Restraints: A Response to Adam Levitin, 56 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 25 (2009) [hereinafter Semeraro, Economic Benefits];
Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Priceless]; Adam J.
Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge
Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265 (2005) [hereinafter Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl].
8. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109
(2014); see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr.,
Engaging Rational Discrimination: Exploring Reasons for Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29 (2009).
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card industry as a whole.9 This Article takes a consolidated view of
this discourse through the lens of public law. Further, this Article
observes how commercial actors either embrace public law’s features or place themselves beyond its reach. The broad power that
commercial credit card lenders possess complicates the protection
of the poor and people of color in the modern marketplace.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of modern payment streams and uses a selection of literature
to discuss how the concept of “network effects” fits within ongoing
arguments for and against interchange fees. It also considers the
informational power supporting the payment card networks’ rentseeking behavior. Part II discusses recent appellate jurisprudence
arising from First Amendment challenges to statutory surcharge
bans, the public policy arguments offered in their defense, and the
historical juxtaposition of legislative prohibitions favoring
surcharges rather than discounts. Part III recognizes the ways in
which mainstream credit card use functions as an important gateway to consumer participation in the economy. Part III also considers the behavioral economics underpinning differential pricing
strategies. It posits that successful First Amendment challenges to
differential pricing schemes will present new questions. While
credit card issuers can engineer prices in such a way that discourages credit card use overall, they tend to exploit behavioral theories
against certain consumers who choose “back loading” fee structures. Back loading fee structures tend to consist of annual percentage rates and other cardholder terms that replace those often found
in alluring introductory offers. Consumers who want to blunt the
harmful effect of back loading practices through reduced card usage
must also weigh this strategy against its costs. Federal law currently
limits payment dispute resolution mechanisms to consumer credit
card transactions. Consumers must therefore consider exploiting
opportunities to improve their credit scores on the one hand, and
ethically problematic pricing practices on the other. Part IV acknowledges commercial law’s historical relationship with racial inequality. It discusses how algorithmic lending models obscure
otherwise impermissible forms of racial bias in the credit card industry. Finally, Part IV considers network effects, pricing psychol9. See, e.g., Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L.
REV. 1071 (2017); Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit
Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 151 (2013) [hereinafter Freeman, Payback]; Oren
Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2012); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card
Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008);
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
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ogy, surcharges, and algorithms that combine to lure consumers
into problematic arrangements that fall outside the normative construction of network effects and harm economically marginalized
populations. This Article concludes with a call to find less-harmful
ways to support consumer access to credit. It also suggests critical
race scholars should examine whether it is possible for ethically
minded consumers to use credit cards without participating in practices that harm marginalized users in the same marketplace.
I. OVERVIEW

OF

MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS

A. Overview and Structure of Payment Networks
The credit card industry grew from humble origins to become
an important fixture in the American and global economies. Universal, non-retail credit cards first appeared in the late 1940s when
Diners Club introduced a “travel and entertainment” card that business travelers could use to pay for meals.10 In 1958, Bank of
America launched Visa as BankAmericard in Fresno, California.11
Eight years later, a group of California banks developed the
“Master Charge: The Interbank Card” to compete with BankAmericard.12 The respective firms eventually adopted the names
Visa and MasterCard. Successful marketing, an expanding consumerist ethos, more favorable attitudes toward credit, and congressional support for deregulation contributed to the successful
expansion of credit card networks. However, two Supreme Court
rulings and the gradual repeal of usury laws allowed credit cards to
establish national lending practices.13
10. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 81–82 (2006) [hereinafter MANN, CHARGING
AHEAD]. Non-retail cards differ from those issued by department stores and other
retailers for exclusive use at the issuing entity’s business. Retail cards have been in
use since the World War II, with Sears & Roebuck being among the earliest
examples.
11. Timothy Wolters, “Carry Your Credit in Your Pocket”: The Early History
of the Credit Card at Bank of America and Chase Manhattan, 1 ENTERPRISE &
SOC’Y 315, 331 (2000).
12. Christine Zumello, The “Everything Card” and Consumer Credit in the
United States in the 1960s, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 551, 565 (2011).
13. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 737–40 (1996) (extending application of
the Marquette Court’s ruling to fees); Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First
of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (holding that the bank’s domicile
was the controlling law governing usury caps rather than customers’ residency).
For a history of state usury laws and the impact of the repeal of state usury laws on
the credit card industry’s expansion, see Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of
Usury Ceilings, Rise of Essay Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L.
REV. 37 (2008).
OF
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Over time, both Visa and MasterCard emerged as dominant
global payment card associations operating as joint ventures owned
by their member banks.14 Initially created as non-stock corporations, both card associations would eventually become publicly held
corporate entities. MasterCard’s spring 2006 Initial Public Offering
(IPO) was noteworthy because of its complex multi-class structure
of share ownership. The transaction carefully allocated ownership
and control among its board and member banks in an effort to limit
the specter of antitrust liability.15 Visa’s March 2008 IPO was one
of the largest in history and raised nearly $18 billion in capital.16
Through issuer and acquirer agreements, which are discussed below, both companies continue selling proprietary payment products
and services to banks and other financial institutions. The banks
and other financial institutions then sell the payment products and
services to consumers and merchants.
Credit card payments are expensive to process. Card networks, however, have succeeded in both promoting credit card usage and devising controversial cost allocation schemes.17 U.S.
cardholders made 103.5 billion payments—worth $5.65 trillion—in
2015.18 This figure reached 111.1 billion—worth $5.98 trillion—in
2016.19 Credit and debit card payments registered the highest
growth among mainstream payment typologies during the same period.20 As card usage increases, so does the systemic power of
credit card networks, especially those run by Visa and MasterCard.
Both cards use similar networks that deploy three services operating in concert to facilitate merchant-to-consumer payments: (1) issuer banks issue credit cards to consumers for use at merchants’
14. For a general history of card associations, see Freeman, Payback, supra
note 9, at 159–60; Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of
Interchange Fees, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 627, 655–57 (2006); K. Craig Wildfang &
Ryan Marth, The Persistence of Antitrust Controversy and Litigation in Credit Card
Networks, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 675, 675–707 (2006); William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 541, 541–82 (1983).
15. See Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for
Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 463–67 (2007) (discussing MasterCard’s post-IPO corporate governance structure in more detail).
16. Lilla Zuill, Visa Raises $17.9 billion in Record IPO, REUTERS (Mar. 18,
2008), https://reut.rs/2u9Rabu [https://perma.cc/PD54-28S7].
17. See David Humphrey et al., What Does It Cost to Make a Payment?, 2
REV. NETWORK ECON. 159, 162–63 (2003) (estimating that credit card transactions
cost merchants twice the amount required to process payment by PIN-based debit
cards or checks).
18. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: 2017 ANNUAL
SUPPLEMENT 1 (2017), https://bit.ly/2PEejbg [https://perma.cc/495Q-8U96].
19. Id.
20. Id.
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establishments that accept the cards as forms of cashless payments;
(2) acquirer banks offer commercial banking services to merchants
to capture and process payments; and (3) third-party payment
processors that typically provide authorization, clearing, and settlement (ACS) services to support the information relay between
banks representing the consumer (issuer) and merchant (acquirer).
The three parties coordinate a multi-step process during any given
transaction. The process begins when a cardholder swipes her card.
When she uses her card, the action triggers a near-instantaneous
transmittal of information to and from the issuer bank.21 If the issuing bank approves the transaction, the issuing bank transfers
funds to the acquirer. At the same time, the acquirer bank deposits
the payment into the merchant’s account, less a processing fee
known as a merchant discount. The issuer card company later bills
the consumer for the transaction, which appears on her bill in the
next billing cycle. While the acquiring bank and third-party ACS
service providers each receive portions of the merchant discount,
the largest share goes to the issuer bank in the form of an interchange fee.
Interchange fee structures vary considerably.22 Issuer and acquirer banks negotiate interchange fee structures up stream. The
banks set the rates based on a merchant’s business sector and sales
volume as well as the kind of card the consumer uses to initiate
payment.23 The banks’ system of categorizing merchants by sector
21. Whereas Visa and MasterCard issue cards through retail banks, American
Express and Discover function as both issuers and network operators. The allocation of merchant discount fees would vary slightly to account for issuer-operated
networks.
22. Visa and MasterCard have complex interchange fee structures with more
than thirty different tiers. For Visa interchange fees, see VISA, VISA USA INTERCHANGE REIMBURSEMENT FEES: VISA SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (2018),
https://vi.sa/2LtqkPw [https://perma.cc/GF23-CE3F]. For MasterCard interchange
fees, see Understanding Interchange, MASTERCARD, https://bit.ly/2BgeDYK [https:/
/perma.cc/P5EZ-FWZM].
23. All but the largest merchants are excluded from negotiating interchange
fee structures. Downstream segments of the market involve consumer and
merchant relationships, whereas upstream segments focus on the commercial activity among issuers and acquirers. Card-based financial products are sold to the general public through retail banking outlets—the most common offerings being debit
cards, credit cards, and prepaid “open loop” credit cards. Examples of “open
loop” cards include prepaid or secure credit cards. They are “stored value” payment instruments that can be reloaded by the user. They differ from credit cards,
which actually extend credit to account holders whenever used to make purchases.
“Open loop” products can be used in any location and online. They differ from
“closed loop” payment cards—like gift cards—that are redeemable at specific
retailers.
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operates alongside IRS Merchant Category Codes.24 As of April
2018, for example, Visa’s interchange fee rates combined a percentage of the transaction amount plus a flat fee, ranging from 1.15 percent plus $0.05 to 2.98 percent plus $0.10 per transaction.25 These
fees add up quickly and amount to substantial payment processing
costs borne by merchants each year. In 2017, Visa and MasterCard
generated $54.69 billion in fees while processing more than $2.5 trillion in transactions.26 In the same year, American Express charged
$16.38 billion in fees to process nearly $703 billion worth of transactions.27 The same firms dominate global payment networks. Visa is
by far the largest, accounting for approximately 56.5 percent of
worldwide commercial and consumer transactions in 2017.28 In the
same year, MasterCard and American Express accounted for 31.4
percent and 9.2 percent of global transactions respectively.29 Issuers use private ordering to sustain these revenues primarily through
cardholder enrollment programs and by allocating card network operating in accordance with network effect principles.
B. Merchant Restraints
Payment processing occurs within a broader combined framework of public and private law. Issuer contracts govern the terms
under which consumers obtain and use credit cards. Issuer contracts must comply with federal consumer protections such as the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA)30 and the Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act).31 Acquirer contracts—and in some states, no-surcharge laws—govern
the legal relationship between merchants and the banks that supply
the infrastructure to capture payments that are generated in con24. There are Merchant Category Codes (MCCs) for different kinds of businesses accepting payments subject to reporting requirements. For example, the
MCC is 4215 for courier services, 1731 for electrical contractors, and 5300 for
wholesale clubs. Rev. Proc. 2004-43.1, 2004-31 I.R.B., https://bit.ly/2Gb05PI
[https://perma.cc/WRB7-QQAT].
25. VISA, supra note 22, at 7–8.
26. U.S. Merchant Card Fees 2017, NILSON REP. (MSN Consultants, Inc.,
Carpenteria, Cal.), May 2018, at 7 [hereinafter 2017 Merchant Card Fees], https://
bit.ly/2RZuWQC [https://perma.cc/X5UU-QXUY].
27. Id.
28. Visa Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Nov. 16, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2SQ0hWh [https://perma.cc/WJX6-2MMT].
29. Id. JBC and Discover held 2.1 percent and 1.3 percent of global sales
volumes, respectively. Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2018).
31. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
11, 15, 20, and 31 U.S.C.).
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nection with merchant businesses. Acquirer-side services include
access to point-of-sale terminals and payment processing
infrastructure.
Acquirer-side contracts tend to contain controversial merchant
restraints. Merchant restraints regulate the conduct of merchants
who accept credit card payments through five kinds of rules: (1)
no-surcharge rules; (2) no-discount rules; (3) honor-all-cards rules;
(4) anti-steering and nondisclosure rules; and (5) no-minimum and
no-maximum purchase rules. The rules are controversial for a host
of reasons. One controversy surrounding the rules is that the
merchant restraint rules effectively support the flow of interchange
fee revenues to issuer banks. Another controversy is that the rules
limit the merchant’s capacity to price goods according to payment
processing costs on a per-transaction basis. The rules also prevent
merchants from signaling payment choice costs to consumers. Additionally, the rules prevent credit card companies from unfairly
shifting the cost of rewards-based card programs to merchants. Finally, the rules ultimately reallocate system costs to consumers who
do not use top-tier card products whilst benefiting those who do.
Each of the merchant restraints is briefly discussed below.
1. No-Surcharge Rules
No-surcharge rules prohibit the imposition of a surcharge for
payments made with credit or debit cards. No-surcharge rules effectively limit the consumer’s capacity to see any nexus between the
price of goods or services and payment choice. Merchants seeking
to preserve their profit margins and comply with this rule must,
therefore, structure their prices to account for the most expensive
processing costs.
2. No-Discount Rules
While surcharge bans prevent upward price adjustments, nodiscount rules prevent merchants from discounting prices based on
payment method choice. The seemingly artificial distinction is relevant because the card industry has been more consistent in opposing surcharges as opposed to any kind of dual pricing. This
preference is reflected in the history of federal and state legislative
provisions. Federal statutory treatment of the two rules, beginning
with the 1974 amendments to TILA, reveals congressional efforts to
wrestle with the debate about surcharges and discounts for a tenyear period. The 1974 amendments required networks to allow
merchant discounting, subject to proper disclosure and a five per-
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cent cap.32 While Congress removed the five percent cap in 1981,33
the disclosure requirement remained in effect. In 1976, while the
authorization of discounts remained, Congress banned merchants’
use of surcharges by amending TILA again.34 Congress used the
amendment to refine the respective meanings of “surcharge” and
“discount” and defined the terms according to their commonly understood usage.35 Congress allowed the ban to expire in 1984 over
the objection of consumer advocates and the Federal Reserve
Board.36 Consequently, credit card networks revived antisurcharge clauses, which remained in effect until 2005.37 In 2005,
another spate of antitrust litigation resulted in Visa, MasterCard,
and American Express removing anti-surcharge clauses from their
merchant restraints as part of a 2013 settlement.38 The only surviving prohibitions against merchants’ surcharge imposition can be
found in state statutes.39 The state statutes are vestiges of 1980s-era
industry lobbying. Recent First Amendment challenges target statutes that originate in this time period.
32. See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j (2018).
33. See Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, 95 Stat. 144 (1981).
34. See Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(q) (2018) (defining “discount” as “a reduction made
from the regular price”); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(r) (defining “surcharge” as “any means
of increasing the regular price to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by cash, check, or similar means”)
36. Cf. Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 201, 95 Stat. 144 (expired
1984); Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1501, 92 Stat. 3641, 3713 (expired 1981); Cash Discount Act
of 1981: Hearing on S. 414 Before the S. Banking Comm., 97th Cong. 9–10 (1981).
37. Complaint, Photos Etc. Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-01007 (D.
Conn. filed June 22, 2005) (alleging Visa, MasterCard, and issuing and acquiring
banks conspired to fix interchange fees in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act).
38. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986
F. Supp. 2d 207, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Dissatisfied with the settlement, a number
of larger merchants successfully appealed to the Second Circuit. See In re Payment
Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir.
2016). It is worth noting that the 2010 Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act
removed card companies’ restrictions on discounting credit cards at the network
level, barring credit card companies from prohibiting merchants from discounting
their cards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2018). This is a network-level change, which
means merchants can discount certain payment methods—such as cash versus
credit cards—but cannot offer or deny discounts based on an issuer or card type—
such as discounting all Discover Cards but not discounting American Express
cards. However, networks retain freedom to impose no-surcharge rules.
39. For a comprehensive list of all surcharge statutes, see Samuel J. Merchant,
Comment, Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction Surcharging and Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark Industry Changes, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 327, 378 (2016).
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3. Honor-all-Cards Rules
Honor-all-cards rules require merchants who accept any card
from a credit card network to accept all cards within that particular
brand, regardless of the interchange fees associated with processing.
A variant on this rule, known as the honor-all-outlets rule, requires
the merchant to accept the brand’s cards at all of its stores, websites, and discount or clearance locations. A 2003 antitrust settlement modified the rule so that merchants accepting Visa or
MasterCard debit cards are not required to accept credit cards from
these networks.40
4. Anti-Steering Rules
Anti-steering rules prevent merchants from using price signals
to steer customers towards less expensive payment products. When
merchants steer customers towards less expensive payment products, the merchants effectively express a preference for one product, brand, network, or payment type over others. Visa and
MasterCard have somewhat relaxed their anti-steering rules in the
wake of antitrust settlements, but American Express awaits a ruling
from the Supreme Court, which heard Ohio’s appeal from a Second
Circuit ruling on February 27, 2018.41
5. No-Minimum/No-Maximum Rules
No-minimum/no-maximum rules aim to prohibit merchants
from declining to accept credit cards as payment for unusually low
or unusually high transaction amounts. Merchants may be tempted
to decline card-based payments for items like chewing gum or
small-margin transactions. Small-margin transactions can eliminate
the merchant’s profit when a consumer pays with an elite card. At
the other end of the cost continuum, high-value items worth tens of
thousands of dollars will incur substantial payment processing fees.
For example, merchants selling $300,000 worth of manufacturing
equipment are likely not keen about surrendering two percent of
the transaction cost (after applicable taxes) to the credit card issuer.
The aforementioned rules produce several important consequences. Firstly, the rules promote adoption of pricing norms that
do not reflect the wide range of costs associated with processing
40. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503,
508 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
41. Chad Bray, Visa, MasterCard Win Approval of Settlement in ‘Anti-Steering’ Case, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2011), https://on.wsj.com/2S1xjCD [https://
perma.cc/63NJ-A3W3]; see also United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179,
192 (2d Cir. 2016).
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different payment products. Secondly, these rules also deny consumers the informational transparency they need to factor transaction costs when choosing one payment type over another.
Additionally, while wealthier customers earn perks through increased card usage, poorer consumers use less desirable payment
options to buy identically priced goods. The disparate realities for
different types of cardholders exacerbate already existing social inequities. Finally, the rules mean that merchants pay different fees
to process payment types from both wealthier consumers and
poorer consumers. Merchants, however, are not allowed to allocate
network costs among cardholders according to the status of payment products consumers’ use at point of sale.
C. Network Effects
The justifications for payment card network rules and fees are
premised on the notion that the rules and fees support a consumption-based economy. The payment card rules and fees give consumers access to credit that they can use to patronize merchants.
The card rules and fees also provide the infrastructure needed to
capture and process cashless forms of payment. Payment card networks commonly invoke the lexicon of network effects (otherwise
known as “network externalities”) in defense of interchange fees
and merchant restraints. The theoretical construct of network effects appears ideally suited to discussions about the function and
design of card networks. Network effects theory is a useful way of
analyzing any kind of system that brokers connections between
buyers and sellers, harmonizes commercial transactional intricacies,
promotes efficiency by allocating costs, supports convenient and secure mobile commerce, or establishes commercial norms.
A network effect exists in two-sided markets, where consumers
and merchants have a mutual economic interest in commercial interaction. Consumers and merchants represent two distinct constituencies with different interests.42 The parties agree to unequal cost
sharing such that merchants on one side of the marketplace bear
most of the marketplace operating expense. Credit card networks
42. For literature on two-sided markets, see Mark Armstrong, Competition in
Two-sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668 (2006); Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competing Matchmakers (Apr. 24, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2d3NfRW [https://perma.cc/8V9M-VU8R]; Sujit Chakravorti
& Roberto Roson, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks, 5 REV. NETWORK ECON. 118 (2006); Geoffrey Parker & Marshall
Van Alstyne, Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1494 (2005); J.C. Rochet & J. Tirole, Platform Competition in
Two-Sided Markets, 4 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).
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use a similar model to allocate payment processing costs.43 One
scholar describes network effects in the credit card context as
follows:
In such a two-sided market, an efficient pricing structure must
discriminate between the two customer groups based upon the
cost of serving each group and their relative demand elasticities.
Because merchant demand for credit cards is less elastic than
consumer demand, an efficient pricing structure will place a
larger cost burden on merchants.44

The two-market network design often turns on two critical
questions. The first considers which group in the market should be
subsidized. The second considers the market subsidy’s longer-term
utility. A successful network requires the subsidized group to be of
value to a subsidizing group. In a two-market network with interchange fees that subsidize one group, the subsidizing group’s
members are willing to pay what is required to access the network.
A network’s value declines if its subsidized group can access more
than one network—a concept known as “multi-homing.” In other
words, individual consumers may sustain varied payment practices,
including credit cards, cash, and checks. Such consumer spending
options produce multi-homing results because the consumer is not
limited to the network subsidized by the merchants. The consumer’s payment options diminish the rent-seeking power of individual payment networks.45 Since consumers are a multi-homing
subsidized group in the credit card two-market network, the network’s value diminishes. Historically, card networks sought to contain consumer upstream multi-homing with contract terms that
prevented member banks from issuing competitors’ cards. How-

43. Thomas R. Eisenmann et al., Strategies for Two-Sided Markets, HARV.
BUS. REV., Oct. 2006, https://bit.ly/1RSHQdK [https://perma.cc/9W6R-4JVX].
44. Semeraro, Economic Benefits, supra note 7, at 26.
45. Rent-seeking occurs where a party manipulates their surrounding social,
political, or legal landscape to secure economic rent without creating new wealth.
For example, an actor can lobby the government to enact legislation compelling
consumers to buy its products or use some combination of its market dominance
and privately contract to limit competition. Gordon Tullock pioneered the concept
of rent-seeking in the regulatory context. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (establishing
the concept of rent-seeking in the regulatory context). But Anne Kreuger subsequently coined the phrase. See generally Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy
of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (coining the phrase
“rent-seeking”).
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ever, litigation put an end to card networks’ ability to seek such
contract terms in 2003.46
Scholars have competing views of multi-homing and its significance to networks. Some theorists suggest that in competitive,
multi-network markets, subsidizers may be less willing to pay as
much to access—and therefore subsidize—other user groups. Subsidizer withdrawal from the network results in the network operator having to reduce or eliminate subsidies previously available to
one of its user groups.47 In other words, the network’s rent-seeking
capacity underpins the power to shift operating costs between participants. Conversely, another argument is that consumers with
multi-network access tend to favor one over others, which may
modify the impact of multi-homing configurations.48
The argument to rationalize network effects as a consumer
protection concern, cost allocation model, or a regulatory virtue
seem logical until one looks back to history. Variants on the disputed honor-all-cards and non-differentiation rules49 were responses to problems posed by federal prohibitions of interstate
branch banking. The restrictions remained in effect until 1994
when Congress passed legislation eliminating geographic restrictions that prevented formation of interstate branch banking.50
Prior to legislative reforms that ended restrictions, banks formed
card associations to navigate the constraints and developed rules to
ensure equal cardholder treatment throughout member
institutions.51
As in any context where one population exploits another population to its benefit, an examination of race and socioeconomic dynamics in the context of network effects is warranted. Part IV of
this Article interposes race and class into the discussion of network
46. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7076 (BSJ), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20222 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied sub nom. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 543 U.S. 811 (2004).
47. See Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, Competing Payment Schemes, 55 J.
INDUS. ECON. 37 (2007); Sujit Chakravorti, Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence, 9 REV. NETWORK ECON. 1 (2010).
48. Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 125 (2009); Marc Rysman, An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (2007).
49. Non-differentiation rules prohibit merchants from charging different
prices for particular types of card products within the same brand. See Levitin,
Priceless, supra note 7, at 1331, 1367–72.
50. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
51. Levitin, Priceless, supra note 7, at 1372.
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effects to consider how First Amendment challenges complicate responses to racism within the card industry. It posits that recent appellate rulings further complicate options for the poor, whose
populations disproportionately include people of color. The recent
court rulings trap the poor between two undesirable choices: (1)
remain in cashless economies, but abandon the use of cashless payment methods commonly used to fortify credit ratings; or (2) participate in card-based payment arenas where network effects
frequently target them and depend on their exploitation to service
more affluent segments of the card market. More immediately,
however, the discussion turns to the First Amendment and its recent entry into the battle over credit card surcharges.
II. OVERVIEW

OF

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Concurrent Development of Payment Card Use and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine
Although statutory surcharge bans have existed in some form
for decades, merchants have not invoked First Amendment arguments until recently. The credit card industry and the commercial
speech doctrine have interesting historical trajectories when we
consider them alongside one another. The respective histories explain why constitutional challenges to surcharge bans did not occur
sooner. In 1942, the United States Supreme Court decided that the
First Amendment did not apply to the government’s regulation of
commercial speech.52 The 1976 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.53 decision marked a formal change in the Court’s position.54 In Virginia Citizens, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protections to commercial
speech.55 Four years would pass before the Court’s 1980 ruling in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.56 Central Hudson established a four-part test for determining
when restrictions on speech violate First Amendment protections.57
The credit card industry underwent considerable change in the
38 years spanning the Court’s initial opinion on commercial speech
and its Central Hudson ruling. Throughout much of that period, the
52. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
53. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
54. Id. at 761–70.
55. Id. at 762.
56. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
57. Id. at 566.
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McFadden Act’s58 constraints and state usury laws hindered the industry’s growth. The Court’s ruling in Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.59 was an important
step in removing state usury caps that contributed to the McFadden
Act’s hindrance on industry growth. The ruling held that states
could not enforce anti-usury laws against nationally charted banks.
This interpretation of the National Bank Act of 1864 allowed such
banks to “export” interest rates into any state, ignoring local usury
laws.60 Regardless of Marquette National Bank’s impact, however,
cardholder enrollment in an era preceding Internet commerce remained relatively modest by today’s standards. Card industry practices had been the subject of antitrust claims,61 suggesting that
merchants developed a shrewd understanding of the commercial interests at stake in coping with merchant restraints. Yet the antitrust
conflicts would not intensify until the period following bank deregulations that aided in bank expansion and the popularization of
cashless payments.
One can only speculate as to why merchants did not take advantage of the commercial speech doctrine sooner through an attack on the federal surcharge ban. The surcharge ban predated
Central Hudson and remained in effect until 1984.62 Instead of using Central Hudson to challenge the ban, card networks and
merchants seemed more interested in fighting to commandeer government’s legislative machinery to further their respective interests.
The former group appeared to prevail between 1976 and 1984 when
federal surcharge bans were in place. When the bans expired, the
card industry’s strategy shifted to lobbying states whose aggregate
population represented well over half of all Americans.63 A compromise in the form of legislation capping interchange fees seemed
likely during the Great Recession and the subprime crisis when
58. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639, 69th Cong., H.R. 2 (1927).
59. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299 (1978)
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2018).
61. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l BankAmericacard Inc., 345
F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Ark. 1972), rev’d, 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973).
62. See Cash Discount Act, Pub. L. No. 97-25, § 201, 95 Stat. 144 (expired
1984).
63. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). “At that point, credit-card companies began lobbying for statelevel surcharge bans. Ultimately, a number of states enacted their own variations
of anti-surcharge legislation.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, No. 100,
2018 WL 5258853, at *15 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2018) (Garcia, J., dissenting). See also,
Levitin, Priceless, at 8 n.7 (stating the legislative history for 11 of the 12 states with
no-surcharge rules). Most state no-surcharge rules appear to be the result of credit
card industry lobbying in the 1980s.
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there was widespread public antipathy towards banks. Despite
popular appetite for expanding financial regulations, Congress’s
consideration of the Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, however, did
not survive committee hearings.64 Once efforts to legislatively restrict interchange fees failed, merchants turned to the courts and
the First Amendment to challenge surcharge bans.
B. Appellate Jurisprudence
When it extended First Amendment protection to commercial
speech, the Supreme Court expressed concern for speech’s informational importance to consumers.65 The Court stressed: (1) the
pressing importance of protecting the flow of commercial information that consumers rely on, particularly in the context of Virginia
Citizens which involved a challenge to a ban on advertising drug
prices;66 (2) the import of marketplace efficiency accomplished
through communicating provenance, purpose, and prices of goods
or services to consumers, as consumers make informed purchasing
decisions;67 and (3) the public interest in the free flow of commercial speech that supports enlightened public decision-making in a
democracy.68
First Amendment challenges to surcharge bans question
merchants’ capacity to give consumers information about the relationship between pricing and payment methods at points of sale.
Merchants argue that sharing information about payment processing costs with customers helps consumers make informed choices
about how to pay for goods and services in the modern marketplace. The theory is that the government is imposing content-based
restrictions on commercial speech, which is subject to intermediate
scrutiny.69 Intermediate scrutiny is an appropriate constitutional
test for content-based restrictions on commercial speech because of
the robustness of the speech and the greater need for flexibility
when regulating this particular kind of expression.70 For commercial categories of speech, the inquiry permits “restrictions directed
64. Credit Card Fair Fee Act of 2008, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. (2008). House
Representative John Conyers, sponsored this bill, which would have imposed a
package of interchange fee regulations.
65. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 749 (1976).
66. Id. at 763.
67. Id. at 765.
68. Id. at 764.
69. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573
(1980).
70. Id.
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at commerce or conduct”—assuming the restrictions further a substantial government interest and are narrowly tailored—even if the
restrictions incidentally limit speech.71 In Central Hudson, the
Court established the now well-known test for whether constraints
on speech violate the First Amendment.72 When determining if the
government may restrict commercial speech without violating the
First Amendment, the court considers the Central Hudson test,
which asks whether: (1) the commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the government’s asserted interest
in restricting the speech is substantial; (3) the restriction directly
advances the government’s asserted interest; and (4) the restriction
is narrowly drawn to serve the asserted government interest.73
There has been limited appellate discussion of Central Hudson
in the context of surcharge bans for two reasons. First, only two
circuit courts that have had the opportunity to apply Central Hudson concluded the challenged statutes regulated speech.74 The second reason simply relates to timing. The appellate challenges
originated from four jurisdictions, three of which were decided
before the Supreme Court considered the issue in Expressions Hair
Design v. Schneiderman.75 Expressions Hair Design marked the
Court’s first time hearing First Amendment challenges to surcharge
bans. By this time, only one circuit court opinion had concluded
that such a ban implicated speech rather than conduct.76 As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s holding in Expressions Hair Design narrowed the scope of inquiry by settling the question of
whether the challenged statutes regulated conduct or speech.77 The
next circuit court to address whether surcharge bans implicate First
Amendment protections followed the Supreme Court’s direction
and applied the Central Hudson test.78 A brief discussion of each
circuit court decision follows.
In 2015, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Expressions
Hair Design, the Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit court to ad71. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–67 (2011).
72. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
73. Id.
74. Whereas Dana’s Railroad Supply attacked the state law’s facial validity,
the plaintiffs in Italian Colors challenged the statute as applied. See Italian Colors
Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2018); Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y
Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1235 (11th Cir. 2015).
75. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
76. See Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1241–46 (finding Florida’s surcharge
ban statute restricted speech).
77. As of June 2018, the Second Circuit has not revisited its prior opinion in
Expressions Hair Design, which was vacated and remanded.
78. See Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1174–79.
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dress whether a certain state statute banning surcharges implicated
the First Amendment.79 Finding Florida’s surcharge ban did implicate a restriction on speech, the court issued the first appellate ruling that applied Central Hudson to a surcharge ban.80 The
Eleventh Circuit’s majority opinion characterized the Florida statute’s surcharge ban as regulating speech rather than conduct and
refused to recognize any distinction between discounts and
surcharge.81 The disputed statutory language provided that:
(1) A seller or lessor in a sales or lease transaction may not impose a surcharge on the buyer or lessee for electing to use a
credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means, if
the seller or lessor accepts payment by credit card. A surcharge
is any additional amount imposed at the time of a sale or lease
transaction by the seller or lessor that increases the charge to the
buyer or lessee for the privilege of using a credit card to make
payment.
...
This section does not apply to the offering of a discount for the
purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not
involving the use of a credit card, if the discount is offered to all
prospective customers.
(2) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) is
guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.82

In a search for reasonable alternative constructions, the court
ruled out arguments that the statute regulated dual-pricing or “baitand-switch” tactics presumably by failing to disclose price differential until after the point of sale. The court went on to use a humorous analogy to explain treatment of the statute as targeting speech
rather than conduct:
Ostensibly worried about customers’ dining experiences being
adversely affected by their unquenched thirst, a state makes it a
crime for restauranteurs to serve half-empty beverages.
Restauranteurs are, however, expressly allowed to serve half-full
beverages. The state has no greater regulatory scheme requiring
restaurants to provide beverage refills, nor does it even require
that beverages be served at all. Would we say that what the state
has done merely regulates the economic affairs of the food-service industry? Of course not. Liability for violating this glass79. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1235.
80. Id.
81. .Id. at 1243 (“Attempting to read Florida’s no-surcharge law as a regulation of economic conduct rather than as a restriction on speech casts the judicial
Theseus into the depths of a lexical labyrinth.”).
82. FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2018).
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half-full mandate turns solely on the restauranteurs’ choice of
words. It is therefore a restriction of speech, not conduct.83

In applying Central Hudson, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the state failed the test’s first prong and rejected arguments that the
statute merely restricted speech in an attempt to prevent illegal
conduct. The state failed the second prong because it could not
sufficiently articulate a compelling “consumer protection” concern.
The court addressed the third and fourth prongs jointly, finding that
the no-surcharge law advanced no substantial state interest.84 Additionally, the court found that there was no evidence that the restriction was tailored, let alone narrowly tailored, to meet any
legitimate government interest.85 Further, the government had
carved out an exception for state agencies to charge card users
“convenience fees” for using a credit card to pay for services.86 The
court noted it was especially hard for the state to justify the statute
in the name of public interest while suspending the statute’s application to state agencies.87
In 2015, and in what would become the Supreme Court case on
the issue, the Second Circuit held in Expressions Hair Design that
the statute in question did not restrict speech, but regulated conduct.88 Since the court found no speech regulation, the Central
Hudson test was irrelevant.89 In reviewing challenges to New
York’s surcharge ban, the Second Circuit interpreted language similar to expired federal TILA provisions.90 The New York statute
provided that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a
surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.”91 Reversing the district
court’s ruling, the Second Circuit held the law “does not violate the
83. Dana’s R.R. Supply, 807 F.3d at 1245.
84. Id. at 1250.
85. Id. at 1249.
86. Id. at 1250; see FLA. STAT. § 215.322(2), (3)(b) (2018).
87. Id.
88. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir.
2015).
89. Id.
90. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a)(2) (1982), with N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518
(Consol. 2016).
91. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518. Two salient features emerge from this language. First, it differs from its federal counterpart in that it did not define
“surcharge.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1666f(a)(2) (1982). Second, it was completely silent
as to merchants’ freedom to induce payments by cash, check, or other means by
offering discounts.
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First Amendment as applied to single-sticker-price sellers.”92 The
court reasoned that price, though communicated through language,
is not necessarily “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.93 The court acknowledged that the law prevented sellers
from “referring to credit-cash price differentials as credit-card
surcharges, or from engaging in advocacy related to credit-card
surcharges.”94 Nonetheless, the court concluded that prohibitions
against imposing credit card surcharges regulated conduct rather
than speech.95 The court accorded weight to the fact that the New
York law was silent about the treatment of price signaling outside
the single-sticker framework.96 Since the statute applied only to
single-sticker pricing, the court stopped short of deciding whether
New York’s law applied to sellers who use “dual-pricing.”
Merchants engage in dual pricing when they post one price for
credit card users and another for those who use cash.97 Since dual
pricing presents possible different issues than single-sticker pricing,
the court only examined the statute as applied to single-sticker
pricing.98
In 2016, the Fifth Circuit considered a Texas statute that restricted surcharges.99 After discussing the Eleventh and Second
Circuit decisions above, the court distinguished the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Florida statute on the basis that the Florida statute expressly permitted discounts.100 The court reasoned
that the New York and Texas statutes, on the other hand, were
“completely silent regarding other forms of pricing.”101 Under the
Texas statute, “a seller may not impose a surcharge on a buyer who
uses a credit card for an extension of credit instead of cash, a check,
or a similar means of payment.”102 The court disagreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s view that discounts and surcharges were mathe92. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir.
2015).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 131.
95. Id. at 135.
96. Id. at 137
97. Id. at 135–37; R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501
(1941).
98. Expressions Hair Design, 808 F.3d at 135–37.
99. Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 81 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
1431 (2017).
100. Id. at 80; see FLA. STAT. § 215.322(2), (3)(b) (2018).
101. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d at 81.
102. Id. at 80 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (West
2018)). We await this court’s analysis of § 518 as a speech regulation following the
Supreme Court’s remand. See also Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137
S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017).
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matically similar.103 The majority reasoned that treating the two as
interchangeable concepts “overlooked differences in the economic
activity, and that the anti-surcharge law solely bans application of
additional fees above the normal price and nothing more.”104
The Supreme Court remanded Expressions Hair Design to the
Second Circuit, before the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in
another surcharge-ban challenge. The Court’s decision in Expressions Hair Design settled the debate about whether surcharge bans
regulated speech or conduct, flatly resolving surcharge bans as
speech regulation.105 Adhering to Expressions Hair Design, the
Ninth Circuit focused solely on the First Amendment arguments
and applied Central Hudson.106 California’s Civil Code provided
that:
No retailer in any sales, service, or lease transaction with a consumer may impose a surcharge on a cardholder who elects to use
a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.
A retailer may, however, offer discounts for the purpose of inducing payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the
use of a credit card, provided that the discount is offered to all
prospective buyers.107

Because the plaintiffs challenged the statute as applied, the
Ninth Circuit focused on those sections of the disputed code pertaining to the plaintiffs, namely the dual-sticker-pricing scheme.108
California’s statute allowed merchants to induce other forms of
payments using discounts but not surcharges. The court, however,
noted the plaintiffs’ preference for using surcharges. The court
noted that the psychological theory informing surcharges—known
as framing—is central to both the statute’s design and the
merchants’ preferred method of communicating price.109
Applying Central Hudson, the Ninth Circuit summarily addressed the first two prongs and found that the plaintiffs were not
engaged in illegal or misleading activity.110 Further, the court
found that California’s stated interest “promote[s] the effective operation of the free market and protect[s] consumers from deceptive
103. Pettijohn, 816 F.3d at 83 (distinguishing Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y
Gen., 807 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015)).
104. Id.
105. Italian Colors Restaurant v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2018).
106. Id.
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (West 2018).
108. Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1172.
109. Id. at 1169.
110. Id. at 1176–77.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 27

MODERN PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS

23-JAN-19

14:56

333

price increases.”111 Moving on to the third element of the test, the
court determined that the state “pointed to no evidence that
surcharges posed economic dangers that were in fact real” before
the statute’s enactment or that the statute resulted in alleviating
those dangers.112 The Ninth Circuit also determined that California’s broad exemptions for state and municipal agencies undermined the state’s purported interest in upholding the statute.113
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that California’s statute failed
to meet the final prong of the Central Hudson test. The court reasoned that “there is no reasonable fit between the broad scope of
[the statute]—covering even plaintiffs’ non-misleading speech—and
the asserted state interest.”114 California, the court said, had
“other, more narrowly tailored, means” of preventing fraud or consumer deception.115 For example, the state could simply ban deceptive or misleading surcharges, require retailers to disclose their
surcharges both before and at the point of sale,116 or enforce existing laws banning unfair business practices and misleading pricing
advertising.117
C. Themes Emerging from Appellate Opinions
The Supreme Court has yet to substantively address the First
Amendment question as it relates to surcharges. Although circuit
rulings are still split, the Court has since vacated the Fifth Circuit’s
decision118 and denied certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.119 Review of these cases, however, yields three observations.
First, the challenged statutes were consistent in their prohibition
against communicating surcharges while showing varied interest in
alternative pricing schemes. None of the opinions canvassed the
relationship between consumer possession of information and the
consumer’s ability to use that information to make informed
choices. The relationship between the accessibility of information
and the consumer’s ability to make informed decisions is a core ele111. Id. at 1177.
112. Id. (“We fail to see how a law that keeps truthful price information from
customers increases the accuracy of information in the marketplace.”).
113. Id. at 1177–78 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489
(1995)).
114. Id. at 1178.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325G.051(1)(a) (2018).
117. Italian Colors, 878 F.3d at 1178.
118. Rowell v. Pettijohn, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017).
119. Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1452 (2017).
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ment of the commercial speech doctrine articulated in Virginia
Citizens.
Second, the challenged statutory provisions uniformly targeted
surcharges while treating other forms of price signaling differently.
California’s regime was the most consumer-friendly and held violators liable for treble damages, plus cardholders’ attorneys’ fees and
costs.120 In New York, the penalty was a maximum fine of $100, up
to one year in jail, or both.121 In Florida, violators faced a maximum fine of $500 or up to 60 days in jail.122 As the least consumerfriendly jurisdiction, Texas law foreclosed any private right of action
against parties in breach of the statute and vested the state regulatory body with enforcement power.123
Finally, state-level agencies in all four affected jurisdictions
preserved their right to impose surcharges where credit cards were
used to pay for services. None of the states could explain how statutes that preserved surcharge restrictions for credit card use at a
government office served public interest while such restrictions for
card use at a local grocery store did not. While the public may not
share consensus on consumer marketplace options, almost every
member of the public over a certain age must periodically engage in
fee-based government services. Whether states intended to consciously prioritize public transaction-cost reduction over private
transaction-cost reduction in credit card use regulation is unclear.
The relationship between the government and private financial institutions, however, is worth noting.
Governments have a complicated and co-dependent relationship with society’s financial institutions. Governments, for example, are essential actors in facilitating the collection and
disbursement of funds. The government must also regulate legal
transactions and criminalize illicit transactions. The government
gives effect to international economic sanctions and generally aids
national monetary policy as a whole. Private financial institutions
also play important roles in our society. Private-sector financial institutions assist in the execution of critical state functions while supporting capital markets. Private financial institutions also issue
loans to businesses of every size and provide the range of banking
services most consumers require over the course of their lives.
While the roles of the government and private financial actors are
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.1(b) (West 2018).
121. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018).
122. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.0117(1), 501.0117(2) (2018).
123. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 339.001(c), (e) (redesignated at TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 604A.0021 (West 2018)).
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labeled differently, the roles interact significantly. The financial industry’s omnipresence endows it with unique standing in the modern economy. Industry constituents often conscript the power of
public law in pursuit of commercial gain. Judicial decisions that
consider surcharge-fee bans in light of the First Amendment offer a
hint of the special arrangements between law, government, and private financial institutions. The judicial decisions are elucidating because they fail to reveal any credible consumer protection concerns.
The judicial decisions discussed above appear to support the inference that the challenged statutes were simply fruits of successful
lobbying. As the following section demonstrates, the successful
lobbying arguably legalized private financial industry influence on
consumer choice through behavioral theory.
III. THE COMMERCIAL PRAXIS OF USING BEHAVIORAL THEORY
ALONGSIDE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW
Knowledge is power. Those with power and those without
power experience information sharing in a marketplace defined by
the uneven distribution of resources differently. Merchant restraints rest, in part, on public and private law to control data distribution for the sake of commercial gain. Merchant restraints also
exploit human cognitive research in various decisional contexts and
therefore complicate how we understand the exercise of choice in
terms of market participation. The Ninth Circuit was the only appellate court to recognize how lenders use the marriage between
law and cognitive science to use price signaling as an intentional
commercial practice.124 This Part discusses how behavioral theory
and highly refined underwriting practices operate within payment
structures. This Part aims to demonstrate that the combination
serves to (1) segment cardholders across different classes to allocate
product-based privileges; (2) exploit socioeconomic differences by
profitably matching cardholder terms with repayment patterns associated with affluence or poverty; and (3) effectively reinforce
points (1) and (2) within card networks by using interchange fees
and network rules to complicate the autonomous exercise of consumer choice at the expense of poor people. Legislative actions
such as those promoting surcharge bans, the removal of usury caps,
and the elimination of barriers to bank expansion combine with private ordering to support the three economic functions described
above.
124. Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2018).
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It is important to note that demand for cards continues to increase against the backdrop of public and private processes that exploit poorer consumers. In 2016, Americans used debit and credit
cards to complete more than 102 billion consumer transactions,
with credit cards being the third most common payment choice.125
In the same year, Americans used credit, debit, prepaid, and Electronic Benefit Transfers (EBT) cards to complete 115 billion transactions. The 2016 data represent a 105 percent increase in volume
since 2005.126
Premium card product promotion as a sign of upward mobility
has been an effective method for increasing popular credit card use.
While online and mobile commerce continue to reinforce the demand for convenient, card-based retail payments, issuer banks have
successfully promoted credit cards as a socioeconomic status symbol. As consumers aspire to mimic lifestyles portrayed in popular
culture, consumers are subtly encouraged to treat cards as a prosperity marker. In fact, not having a credit card commonly elicits
bemusement and can be its own source of stigma. Because issuers
bundle cards with programs affiliated with airlines, hotels, rental
car companies, and upscale department stores, issuers tend to attract affluent consumers. Reward-based card usage, however, incurs higher processing costs than non-reward cards. Rewards cards
represent a drain on merchants because the rewards system continues to expand without a commensurate increase in the number or
volume of transactions.127
The expanding presence of reward-based credit cards marks a
point of diverging interests between merchants and less affluent
consumers. Larger merchants, however, have a compelling commercial motive for using antitrust litigation against reward-based
card systems. Antitrust litigation could secure a windfall reduction
in the cost of processing cashless payments while still supporting
high sales traffic in a market defined by continuously expanding
card use. Poorer cardholders and merchants may have divergent
interests in limiting rewards-based cards because a reduction in rewards-based cards does not necessarily translate into lower prices.
Indeed, legitimate complaints about the apparent unfairness of payment card rules are not presumably aligned with the priorities of
poorer consumers. Winning antitrust claims in court may only
125. 2017 Merchant Card Fees, supra note 26.
126. Id.
127. See generally Andrew Ching & Fumiko Hayashi, Payment Card Rewards
Programs and Consumer Payment Choice, 38 J. BANKING & FIN. 1773 (2010).
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widen profit margins without any corresponding change in the
prices consumers pay for goods or services.
A. Targeting the Poor as a Profit Center
Independent of merchants’ litigation posture, card network
rules ensure poorer consumers support their affluent counterparts
regardless of payment method. Card network rules and merchant
restraints are only two of the industry practices that exacerbate the
economic marginalization of the poor. Another way the credit card
industry economically marginalizes the poor is through exploiting
the fact that poor people are more likely to use cards to meet basic
needs. Poor people are more likely to use cards for basic needs
when they would not otherwise have the resources to pay for those
needs. Thus, poor people are more susceptible to industry practices
that depend on consumer debt. Poorer populations also occupy a
segment of the card-user market where consumers are most sensitive to price and, by extension, psychologically exploitative tactics.
One might expect that high levels of consumer debt would
worry lenders.128 Transactional paradigms and lending practices,
however, operate conjointly because they capture revenue from
both interest on outstanding balances and late fees. Consider that
top-tier borrowers who pay off their monthly balances generate
limited fee-based revenues. Fee-based revenues are related to the
transactions themselves and place the financial burden on
merchants at the point of sale. Subsistence borrowers, on the other
hand, incur fees for late payments and cash advances, as well as
interest on revolving balances. The fee-based revenue from top-tier
borrowers coupled with profits on interest, late fees, and cash advances from subsistence borrowers leave lenders quite comfortable
with high levels of consumer debt.
The above observations about profits relating to top-tier versus
subsistence bowers are consistent with the results of a recent study
published by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).129
The CFPB study is relevant to understanding lender comfortability
with high consumer debt because credit records indicate borrowers’
credit scores. Credit scores as contained in credit records are a
common underwriting and sorting tool lenders use to determine
consumer eligibility for particular classes of credit card products.
128. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373,
1373–74 (2004) [hereinafter Bar-Grill, Seduction].
129. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CONSUMER CREDIT CARD
MARKET (2017) [hereinafter CFPB], https://bit.ly/2o0bTJj [https://perma.cc/RP4KHKTC].
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Lenders also use credit scores as a proxy for locating subsistence
borrowers who use credit cards to meet basic needs. In short, consumer credit scores are strong indications for which consumers are
likely to become profitably delinquent.
In the study, the CFPB purchased and analyzed a 1-in-48 longitudinal sample of de-identified credit records from one of the national credit reporting agencies. The data set was a representative
sample of consumers with credit records. According to the report,
borrowers in the bottom two quintiles show greater increases in
outstanding general-purpose debt than other consumers.130 While
increases among subprime and near-prime consumers were 21 percent and 18 percent, respectively, the increase reached 38 percent
for deep-subprime borrowers.131 Per-consumer credit card debt for
all cardholding consumers increased nine percent since the second
quarter of 2015.132 Average balances for consumers with lower
credit scores, however, increased substantially more. In fact, the
deep-subprime credit score tier experienced average balance increases by 26 percent over the same time period.133
The CFPB’s data support the inference that a relatively small
number of consumers who use credit cards to meet basic needs are
ripe targets for exploitation. Of course, the inference largely depends on the trajectory of a consumer’s social mobility relative to
the consumer’s ability to obtain a credit card. If, for example, a
consumer obtains a credit card prior to job loss, medical emergencies, or other financially significant events, the consumer may enjoy
card benefits no longer commensurate with their deteriorating economic situation. Conversely, a credit-seeker already living in poverty with severely limited income occupies a different place within
the credit card market if the credit-seeker’s application is already
approved. Nonetheless, poorer consumers in the bottom two quintiles are more likely to be delinquent debtors who sustain card usage patterns profitable to payment networks.134
Among the six largest card issuers, five reported that interest
charges accounted for 69 to 71 percent of their income between
2003 and 2005.135 More recent data indicates that banks continue
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 10, at 201–02; Joseph B.
Cahill, Where It’s Due: Credit Companies Find Tough Rival at Bottom of Consumer Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1998, at Al.
135. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DIS-
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targeting the poor as an intentional business strategy.136 Banks are
anxious to preserve interest charge revenues, and Clinton-era banking deregulation coupled with the elimination of usury statutes allow them to.137 Highly refined underwriting practices enable banks
to predict which consumers are likely to become profitably delinquent.138 Cards with low limits and high fees—called “fee harvesters”—are commonly marketed to low-income communities, often
through the mass mailing of pre-approved cards. Even after segmenting prospective cardholders according to risk, payment history,
and overall creditworthiness at the point of application, issuers will
subsequently “reprice” accounts. Issuers reprice accounts through
adjusting interest rates and other so-called “teaser repayment
terms” that lure new customers with less favorable terms a year or
more after enrollment. Client behavior will determine at least
some of the adjustments. But account-repricing practice also allows
issuers to promote artificially low introductory rates by chronologically “backloading” the real costs of borrowing. The backloaded
costs only take effect several months after enrollment. As part of
the Dodd-Frank reforms, the CARD Act imposed limits on such
deferred-cost strategies. Among other limitations, the CARD Act
capped fees institutions could charge for over-the-limit borrowing
and late payments.139 Additionally, the CARD Act prohibited socalled “double cycle” billing.140 Double cycle billing calculates financing charges for card-based borrowing over two billing cycles
instead of one.141 The CARD Act’s impact, however, remains unclear. For example, in 2013, the CFPB determined that credit card
interest rates increased from 16.2 percent to 18.5 percent, even
though the total cost of credit fell by two percent.142 Therefore, it is
unclear what aggregate impact the CARD Act has on borrowers.
CLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 69 (2006) [hereinafter GAO], https://bit.ly/2UL6qVl
[https://perma.cc/BVB4-ZAYH].
136. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (June 2016), https://bit.ly/2PKNT7K [https://perma.cc/8QT5-R6JS].
137. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
138. Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low and Moderate
Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND
BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 252, 257 (Rebecca M. Blank &
Michael S. Barr eds., 2009).
139. 12 C.F.R. § 226.52(a)(1) (2018).
140. For a useful summary of the CARD Act’s impact on risk-based pricing
practices, see Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 9, at 986–1001.
141. Id.
142. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT 70–76 (Oct. 1,
2013), https://bit.ly/2Eus7Dd [https://perma.cc/FXN2-RKV4].

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK201.txt

340

unknown

Seq: 34

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

23-JAN-19

14:56

[Vol. 123:307

Poverty is expensive. Poverty’s multifaceted elements seem to
exert themselves on disadvantaged populations—disproportionately represented by people of color—with cruel synchronicity.
People living in low-income neighborhoods face myriad problems
associated with economic marginalization. Issues like substandard
housing, limited access to affordable goods and services, underfunded public infrastructure, high crime, and suboptimal health
outcomes combine to make life more expensive. Not only is each
problem expensive, but the combination of the problems increases
the cost of meeting basic needs. When financial emergencies arise,
recourse through obtaining personal loans from banks, borrowing
from similarly distressed family and friends, or seeking additional
social welfare benefits may be either unavailable or limited. Credit
cards as a short-term option to meet basic financial needs offer a
degree of convenience and dignity other financial pathways cannot
provide. But credit card use is not without its costs. The costs associated with credit card use for poor people warrant a discussion
about the psychology of choosing from a range of bad choices in
times of economic distress.
B. Mapping the Confluence of Behavioral Theories
What motivates an individual’s choice of payment? How has
the mix of public law and private network rules interacted with consumer inclinations within and across borrower segments? As scholars, we must delicately navigate the tension between two narratives.
One narrative endorses perceptions of poor people as inherently
lacking self-control or financial discipline. The narrative archetypes
poor people as lacking sufficient regard for the social, economic,
racial, and other forces that trap people in contexts where they
need to spend more than they can earn. The other narrative rejects
the archetype that poor people inherently lack self-control and financial discipline. Instead, the other narrative considers systemic
financial practices that prey on poor people. Those who adhere to
the second narrative advocate for legislative restraints on card issuers. The narrative for legislative restraint, however, fails to consider the legitimate arguments in favor of making credit available to
the poor.143
143. For examples of calls for reviving usury caps, see Vincent D. Rougeau,
Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest
Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of
the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2004). For a discussion that cautions against harming risky borrowers by setting usury rates too high
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Writings in these two fields continue to borrow from behavioral economics. Behavioral economics is premised on the notion
that people make irrational decisions in important decisional contexts.144 The irrational decisions can be myopic and impulsive,
where the decision-maker gives undue weight to immediate wants
that, if acted upon, can harm the decision-maker’s long-term interests. Irrational optimism, incorrect predictions of the achievability
of desired results, overeating, and procrastination are some examples of behavioral patterns that persist in the face of logical
alternatives.
Society traditionally bifurcates its response to such human
frailties. One response is to constrain the freedom of powerful actors from exploiting irrational behavioral patterns. The other response is to defer to free market powers, where competition
incentivizes businesses to exploit and monetize behavioral inclinations. Credit card use fits neatly within this paradigm precisely because consumers must weigh credit card use against consumers’
inclination to obtain and use credit cards in dysfunctional ways. In
light of some of the risks associated with behavioral economics,
some card issuers include a customer’s credit score in the customer’s monthly bill and include information about interpreting
credit score information. In theory, the additional information allows consumers to establish a logical nexus between card usage and
creditworthiness. The monthly bill also indicates, however, the consumer’s remaining credit available for further spending. Information about additionally available credit may completely undo any
warning that the consumer might have registered with the credit
score information because of behavioral economic implications.
For example, the information about additional available credit may
come at a time when the cardholder is disposed to making nearterm purchases at the expense of harming the consumer’s longerterm financial well-being.
The exploitation of buyers’ behavioral inclinations in an effort
to sell goods and services is a timeless marketing strategy. When
successful, card industry promotional practices concurrently exert
pressure on transactional and lending spaces. Card industry promotional practices expand the presence of expensive reward programs.
Card issuers service the expensive reward programs through reveor too low, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy’s Home Economics, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 52 (2004).
144. For an excellent discussion about the broadening presence of behavioral
economics in law, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics
and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1832 (2013).
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nue streams from rigidly enforced interchange fee structures as well
as from less affluent borrowers most likely to pay late fees and interest on revolving balances. The commercial ethos built on using
the less affluent to finance affluent purchaser programs is carefully
designed around theories of behavioral economics.
The theory of hyperbolic discounting offers a useful framework
for explaining why borrowers enroll in credit card programs they
ought to avoid.145 The theory begins with someone who would
rather receive $5 now instead of $10 in 90 days. The immediacy of
receiving less now outweighs the value of higher payment later. If,
on the other hand, one had a choice of receiving $35 today and $70
tomorrow, waiting a day might seem rational. Two counterintuitive
aspects underlie the cognitive bias for immediate payment. First,
the importance of the extra $35 diminishes as the delay gap between immediate and deferred payment widens. The importance
diminishes even though the value of the latter payment remains
constant. Second, the devaluing effect of time diminishes after a
certain time threshold, such that most are likely to accept $70 in
five years rather than $35 in four years. The hyperbolic pattern of
recipient bias towards discounting and time passage earns the theory its name. Hyperbolic discounting is not entirely rational, but it
reflects how calculating immediacy and delay informs our financial
decisions. Most people understand that using a credit card to spend
$1,000 and making minimum payments on that balance will take
106 months to pay off at 15 percent interest. Somewhere in the
recesses of their minds, they also anticipate retiring the debt will
cost more. But hyperbolic discounting functions like short-term
tunnel vision. Hyperbolic discounting allows the consumer to see
only the near-term benefit as divorced from the costs of servicing
the debt further into the future. Hyperbolic discounting in terms of
debt servicing is a form of underestimation bias, or the inclination
to underestimate financial burdens associated with servicing debts
over time.146
Behavioral psychology also informs the design of existing
surcharge prohibitions in states where surcharge prohibitions remain. While the distinction between a discount and a surcharge
may seem nonsensical, the framing effect suggests something different: surcharges beyond the retail price are more likely to deter
credit card use than a discounted price is to encourage cash payment.147 The theory is premised on the notion that framing a price
145. See Bar-Gill, Seduction, supra note 128, at 1395–1400.
146. Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 9, at 976.
147. Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl, supra note 7, at 280.
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difference as a discount elicits less negative reaction than imposing
an additional fee.
Card networks owe their current structure and functions not to
network effects but to the regulations in place at the time of card
network inception. While a large swath of cardholders benefit from
the reallocation of operating costs, such arrangements support pricing regimes that harm merchants as well as consumers living in poverty. Issuer markets complement the inequities by segmenting
consumers and promoting products that card issuers perceive to
match anticipated spending patterns within each respective subset
of cardholders. The network and market strategies harness behavioral psychology and marshal its effects against the public. The
poor are most notably harmed by strategies that employ behavioral
psychology because poor people face socioeconomic challenges that
make debt servicing difficult and, therefore, commercially lucrative.
Conscripted into silence by contract and, in the most populated
markets, statutes, merchants cannot adjust to the card industry’s economic arrangements that use the same behaviorally informed
strategies trained on their customers. Nor can merchants give consumers the information needed to make adjustments for themselves
at point of sale, which is when consumers often make most payment
choices.
Nevertheless, card networks’ coercive rent-seeking power ensures merchants will continue accepting cards. Our capitalist and
spending-obsessed society is unlikely to grow out of credit cards any
time soon. Merchants otherwise tend to prefer card payment because consumers tend to spend more when paying with cards as opposed to cash or checks.148 Further, the latter payments carry risks
of theft, forgery, or alteration. Merchants also have the option of
bundling payment capture programs with invoicing, scheduling, and
other services of particular value to smaller businesses. As segments of cardholders continue to cluster around more expensive
card products, merchants must weigh the costs of accommodating
consumer preferences against other economic benefits. Until recently, the card industry has successfully preserved the more controversial merchant restraints throughout most U.S. markets by
lobbying for anti-surcharge statutes in several states, including California, New York, and Texas. Significantly, the populations in these
jurisdictions account for roughly half of all Americans. Therefore,
it should not be surprising that these jurisdictions would be the first
to see First Amendment challenges to surcharge regulations.
148. Id.
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COMMERCIAL LAW’S AMORAL RELATIONSHIP WITH RACE
ANTECEDENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL REDLINING

AS AN

This Part explores how algorithmic lending models obscure impermissible forms of racial bias in the credit card industry. It also
considers how network effects, pricing psychology, surcharges, and
algorithms combine to lure consumers into problematic arrangements that fall outside the normative construction of network effects. This Part examines how the combination harms economically
marginalized populations. This Part also links structural racism’s
historical precursors to present-day technologies, which may produce new forms of racially problematic lending practices. Further,
present-day technologies make disentangling racially problematic
lending practices from the legitimate identification of high-risk borrowers more difficult.
A. A Brief History of Race and Lending
Commercial law has historically supported profit-making potential, even in the face of moral hazards. The support for profit is
evident in the history of credit availability as an essential ingredient
in expanding America’s domestic economy. Some of today’s largest
banking institutions acknowledge economic and historical ties to
slavery for their success. The banks directly engaged financially
with slavery from the colonial period to the period immediately after the Civil War. Indeed, after the Civil War, courts had to adjudicate claims seeking to enforce debt secured by human collateral.
Banks were not passive actors in commercial arrangements
formed around the enslavement of human beings. A study published in 2010 demonstrated, through studying 8,840 mortgages recorded in the 18th and 19th centuries, that banks and smaller
creditors accepted a showing of slave ownership to secure loans.149
More recently, J.P. Morgan issued a January 2005 statement admitting its predecessor entities—Citizens Bank and Canal Bank in
Louisiana—“accepted approximately 13,000 slaves as collateral for
loans and ended up owning approximately 1,250 of them as a result
of defaults.”150 Six months later, Wachovia Bank reported that two
institutions it acquired—Georgia Railroad and Banking Company
and the Bank of Charleston—also owned slaves.151
149. Bonnie Martin, Slavery’s Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property,
76 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 817, 818 (2010).
150. Katie Benner, Wachovia Apologizes for Slavery Ties, CNN MONEY (June
2, 2005), https://cnnmon.ie/2PHVGmU [https://perma.cc/QK5F-E8BN].
151. Id.
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Relative to other forms of collateral, slaves were qualitatively
distinct, not merely as human property, but because they were considered mobile, liquid, and therefore more saleable than land.
Bank of Kentucky v. Vance’s Administrators,152 a case involving two
creditors with competing security interests in the same item of collateral, offers a useful illustration.153 But for the human collateral,
the case’s facts would be standard reading for law students learning
about attachment, perfection, and the determination of creditor priority when those creditors have secured interests in the same items
of collateral. Two debtors, A. Morehead and Robert Latham, secured a loan with land and slaves.154 Two years later, a man known
only as Vance endorsed a bill of exchange drawn by the same pair
of debtors.155 Vance secured the bill of exchange with the same
slaves previously mortgaged to the Bank of Kentucky.156 After
years of repeatedly renewing the loans and struggling to meet payment obligations, both creditors seized and sold the debtors’
slaves.157 Both creditors sued, each alleging a superior security interest in the slaves.158 Although the Bank of Kentucky prevailed,159 the litigation posture reveals a more important narrative
about slaves’ value. Although the bank had different kinds of collateral, the slaves were Vance’s only collateral.160 Vance argued the
bank should dispose of other assets to enforce its collection
rights.161 The court disagreed, holding that the bank, as superior
lienholder, could prioritize disposition of its collateral as it saw
fit.162
Legal uncertainty in the years immediately following emancipation clouded the legal standing of transactions premised on slave
ownership. Uncertainty grew because the law no longer deemed
former slaves as property. Nonetheless, banks remained keen to
enforce loans secured by slaves in the period between emancipation
and 1871. In 1871, the Supreme Court settled the question of
whether such obligations were enforceable following passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment, which William Henry Seward proclaimed
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Bank of Ky. v. Vance’s Adm’rs, 14 Ky. 168 (1823).
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 175.
See Bank of Ky., 14 Ky. at 168.
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into force in 1865.163 The Civil War’s somewhat unorganized conclusion further contributed to the legal uncertainty. The Civil War
concluded without any compensation schemes to address slave
emancipation’s commercial consequences. More specifically, there
was no mechanism to clarify the enforceability of negotiable instruments previously secured with human collateral. Such compensation schemes were possible and followed abolition in countries like
Barbados, Brazil, South Africa, or elsewhere.164 In America, however, the financial disorganization of the Civil War’s conclusion and
emancipation created a quagmire that set the stage for systemic financial subjugation of blacks.
The post-war reconstruction period eventually gave way to Jim
Crow laws, which intentionally limited the economic ascendance of
black communities. A variety of financial regulations and practices
operated in concert to control the allocation of wealth, pathways to
upward economic mobility, and meaningful political participation.
For example, banking practices, which were often enforced with violence, cemented into place a set of enduring institutional norms
that reached into every aspect of public and private life. Black
Codes165 kept African-Americans in segregated schools, barred enrolment in colleges and universities, severely restricted entry into
various occupations, and controlled freedom of movement. The
Department of Agriculture systemically denied black farmers equal
access its loan programs, which allowed their white counterparts to
further prosper.166 Under the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of
1944, commonly known as the “GI Bill,” financial institutions denied various forms of financial assistance for African-American
soldiers returning from serving overseas. For example, when returning African-American soldiers sought funding to attend college

163. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646 (1871); see Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann.
234 (1867); see also New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Templeton, 20 La. Ann.
141 (1868).
164. There were limited exceptions, such as legislative schemes permitting
compensation for former slave owners in the District of Columbia. See Act of
April 16, 1862, ch. 54, §§ 2–3, 12 Stat. 376.
165. Black Codes were laws passed by state legislatures that sought to control
and inhibit the freedom of ex-slaves following the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment. See Isaac Saidel-Goley & Joseph William Singer, Things Invisible to
See: State Action and Private Property, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 439, 447–48 (2018)
(“The Black Codes blatantly circumvented the Thirteenth Amendment by attempting to restore slavery in all but name.”).
166. See Jim Chen, Of Agriculture’s First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1261, 1306 (1995); Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies
and Food Oppression, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1277 n.32 (2015).
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or for other programs under the GI Bill, the government administrative agencies routinely denied their requests.167
Notably, the structures that limited black communities were
qualitatively distinct from those limiting Asian and European immigrant populations.168 For example, government-endorsed financial
policies resulted in “the [city] ghettos that initially trapped
America’s other immigrant groups [to] eventually improve themselves out of existence.”169 The other immigrant groups relocated
to suburbs where African-Americans were excluded through violence, zoning restrictions, and racially restrictive covenants.170 With
extensive government support, lending institutions often participated in the exclusion of blacks from moving out of ghettos. Lending institutions either actively cooperated with redlining to deny
consumer and commercial loans to members of predominantly
black inner-city neighborhoods, or resorted to reverse redlining.171
Reverse redlining occurs when lending institutions target the same
populations otherwise subject to redlining with less desirable loan
products.172 Additionally, the onset of credit scoring in the 1950s
amplified the effect of carefully engineered racial disparities.
Credit scores exacerbated racial disparities in unequal housing, employment, pay, education, and health because it uses these and similarly racially stratified metrics to determine creditworthiness.
Today, highly sophisticated technologies join credit scoring to capture vast amounts of transactional data. Financial institutions use
the transactional data in underwriting and racially targeted marketing. Smartphones, mobile Internet access, location technologies,
digital wallets, and census data now aid in data harvesting, which
has transformed banking institutions into technocapitalist
entities.173
167. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284.
For an excellent history on the unequal treatment of African-American soldiers
after the World War II, see Sarah Turner & John Bound, Closing the Gap or
Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 145, 145–77 (2003).
168. For a discussion of how immigrant groups fared relative to AfricanAmerican communities from the turn of the 20th century, see MEHRSA
BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 6 (2017).
169. BARADARAN, supra note 168, at 6.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. “Technocapitalism is an emerging form of market capitalism, rooted in
invention and the development of new technologies.” Luis Suarez-Villa, The Rise
of Technocapitalism, 14 SCI. STUD., no. 2, 2001, at 4, 4.
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From colonial times to the present, those who have white supremacist sentiments employ various paradigms to support racialized disparate treatment. For example, 19th century white
supremacist apologists look to eugenics for philosophical and
pseudo-scientific support.174 More recently, 20th century economic
theories that disfavor government intervention provide cover for
maintaining racialized wealth gaps. Economic theories that frown
upon government wealth redistribution invoke arguments for minimizing any role state power might play in corrective programs. The
same economic theories, however, overlook the legacy of heavy
government involvement that entrenched the economic and political subordination of racial minorities. The government’s involvement did not simply undermine the economic advancement of black
communities. Government-sanctioned racial subordination furthers institutional racism’s primary function: to compound existing
advantages already afforded white communities.
B. The Strengths and Limits of Algorithmic Lending
Algorithms are capable of widening the sweep of information
that marketing and underwriting processes use to determine
creditworthiness. An algorithm is a computerized procedure or
formula used to solve one or more problems. Algorithms, however,
also tend to reflect the biases of software engineers who design
them. Software applications, like Microsoft Excel, contain examples of basic algorithms. Such software applications use limited instructions to streamline the generation of predictable outcomes that
might take longer manually. Aside from basic algorithms, software
engineers have developed much more sophisticated learning algorithms. Learning algorithms learn on their own and are often based
174. Eugenics is premised on the theory that human shortcomings were hereditary. It posits that humanity’s best hope for survival is to promote reproduction among society’s healthiest and most productive members. Conversely, it
seeks to discourage those deemed less fit from reproducing. American eugenicists
used this theory to develop a cross-disciplinary pseudo-science with a view to pursuing laws that would mandate social ordering along racial lines. For a discussion
of eugenics generally, see DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS (1985);
MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (1984); ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS (1977); KENNETH
LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1972). This theoretical system
extended beyond the sorts of anti-miscegenation laws at issue in the landmark
Loving v. Virginia ruling, but also in a broader policymaking sense. See Paul A.
Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v.
Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1988); Melanie Fong & Larry O. Johnson,
The Eugenics Movement: Some Insight into the Institutionalization of Racism, ISSUES CRIMINOLOGY, Fall 1974, at 89, 99–100.
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on a combination of initial instructions and subsequent human
input.
Consumers experience learning algorithms when they visit a
retailer’s website, search for a specific item, and are directed to a
range of other products based on their past purchasing histories.
Based on a learning algorithm, the website may also direct the site
visitor to the purchasing histories of other customers who bought
the same item. Social media sites use similar algorithms to suggest
content about a destination city’s attractions after users search for
or travel to new places. Algorithmic processes often work in tandem with Big Data. Big Data is a shorthand label referring to vast
data sets computationally analyzed to discern a wide range of
human behaviors.
There has been extensive commentary in academia and the
popular press about algorithms’ effect on inequality.175 A recent
controversy involving the online retailer Amazon is instructive. In
April 2016, Bloomberg reported that Amazon Prime same-day delivery service was not available in large portions of predominantly
African-American zip codes.176 The pattern replicated in six major
cities where this program was otherwise available.177 According to
the report, black citizens in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and Washington, D.C. were “about half as likely to live in neighborhoods with
access to Amazon same-day delivery as white residents.”178 For example, in New York City, same-day service largely excluded the
Bronx, a predominantly minority borough.179 A similar pattern
emerged in Boston’s predominantly black Roxbury neighborhood,
where Amazon Prime member residents could not get same-day delivery that was available elsewhere in the city.180 Predictably, Amazon’s vice president for global communications denied that race
factored in the implementation of its same-day service.181 The
same-day rollout prioritized zip codes, he said, with high concentra175. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2Conr0r [https://perma.cc/TQ3W-AZDB]; Will Knight, Biased Algorithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care, MIT TECH. REV. (July 12,
2017), https://bit.ly/2R2QsqH [https://perma.cc/ZJ4S-5DCJ].
176. David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its
Customers. Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://bloom.bg/2koKDjQ
[https://perma.cc/VR6F-FET3]. The Amazon Prime program charges enrollees a
fee in exchange for benefits, such as free same-day delivery, not available to other
customers.
177. Ingold & Soper, supra note 176.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
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tions of Prime members.182 While the vice president’s assertions
may be true, such data-driven strategies reinforce the effect of preexisting inequalities in cities where prioritized zip codes consisted
of predominantly white residents. Was this a case of “algorithmic
redlining” learned by the retailer’s information systems, or was it a
natural consequence of software engineers failing to account for racism’s legacy in prioritizing the rollout of new services? Is there a
way to infuse algorithmic processes with equity-based parameters
that do not otherwise undermine their broader functional utility?
The advent of algorithms and other complex technologies echo
the historical marriage between white supremacy and socially legitimizing frameworks in ways that make the old seem new. Like 19th
century scientists, today’s software engineers enjoy the presumption
that their systemically important work generates an output entirely
free of frailties commonly associated with humans. Indeed, there is
some literature suggesting algorithms can use non-traditional lending criteria to increase access to credit183 and identify “credit invisibles” or creditworthy borrowers that traditional lenders often
overlook.184 But software engineers are humans, and their biases
slip into their work product. Software-engineer bias shapes the
logic of automated decision-making.185 Tech workers are like other
professionals whose members do not unanimously share the same
values. A difference in values can lead to conflict in an arena where
highly problematic views of minorities become atomized, normative, and deployed across cyberspace.
One example of conflict in the tech industry based on divergent ideologies is that of James Damore. In April 2017, Damore, a
software engineer at Google, sparked controversy after writing an
infamous memo decrying his employer’s diversity initiatives.186 Titled Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber, the short memo argued
that initiatives seeking to diversify his field were misaligned with
what he described as biological differences predisposing men to be182. Id.
183. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 155–59 (2016).
184. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES
(May 2015), https://bit.ly/2EBa2UT [https://perma.cc/QQ2D-PXGE] (using the
term “credit invisibles” to describe the 26 million Americans with no credit history
or the additional 19 million whose credit cannot be scored because their histories
are limited or too old).
185. See SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 2 (2018).
186. See James Damore, Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber (July 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2wCkHqk [https://perma.cc/6KMZ-QLM3].
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ing better in his particular work environment.187 The memo went
on to say, “discriminating just to increase the representation of
women in tech is as misguided and biased as mandating increases
for women’s representation in the homeless, work-related and violent deaths, and school dropouts.”188 Leaving aside the claims’ substantive merits, Damore’s claims are telling in the breadth of social
issues swept up in connection with his view of gender differences.
Readers should pause to consider what software code might produce when written under the influence of a professional community
with fundamentally divergent social values. One scholar argues
that technology firms will find it increasingly difficult to separate
their products from their workers’ harmful ideologies.189 Another
data analyst expressed the point differently:
When we translate cultural clichés and stereotypes into empirically verifiable datasets, we introduce subjectivity into a discipline that strives for objectivity. When we imbue our Big Data
insights with our race-based biases, we project our prejudices
onto subsequent observations.190

Scholars who call for the prevention of algorithmic bias voice
general concern about discrimination191 and about the importance
of designing algorithms with transparent and equitable safeguards.192 Counterarguments suggest that modifying algorithms to
reflect desired social norms is a form of Libertarian Paternalism.
The view that algorithm modification is paternalistic is based on the
premise that it serves as a vessel for future abuse by public or private actors.193 Actors who could abuse the modifications would ar187. See id.
188. Id.
189. See NOBLE, supra note 185, at 127.
190. Cecilia Esther Rabess, Can Big Data Be Racist?, BOLD ITALIC (Mar. 30,
2014), https://bit.ly/2GjU6YW [https://perma.cc/4UVS-T42Z].
191. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1251 (2008); see also Michael Schrage, Big Data’s Dangerous New Era of
Discrimination, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 29, 2014), https://bit.ly/2pux98L [https://
perma.cc/8GBQ-G9W2].
192. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harm, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014); see
also PASQUALE, supra note 8; Oscar H. Gandy, Engaging Rational Discrimination:
Exploring Reasons for Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29 (2008).
193. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Richard H. Thaler &
Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003); Gregory
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005);
cf. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
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guably seek to constrain individual freedoms related to exercising
moral choice.194 But much of the debate originates from outside
payment-systems scholarship, where experts must examine expanding consumer presence in the credit card arenas. A 2010 Wall
Street Journal investigation describes how algorithmic lending
mines Big Data and complicates efforts to detect bias.195 According
to the article, Capital One Financial Corp. used online marketing
firm [x+1] Inc. to algorithmically profile prospective customers.196
The firm captured code from users’ computers who visited the issuer’s website.197 [x+1] captured information from a prospective
borrower’s computer, including their zip code, income, education,
and precise location at the time of application.198 [x+1] also used
“behavioral databanks” to build a composite of assumptions about
the users’ proclivities.199 [x+1] then assembled the data points and
used the information to place consumers in one of 66 Nielson demographic segments.200 Where each consumer fell in the Nielson segments determined the card products the card issuer offered at the
time of enrollment.201
Concerns about inequity persist in the face of assurances that
such practices comply with ECOA. For example, the algorithm
placed a white woman in Neilson’s “Young Influentials” segment of
suburbanites who earn roughly $50,000 per year.202 Although it
correctly determined where she lived, it underestimated her income
and incorrectly assumed she might buy rap music or read Vibe, a
hip-hop magazine.203 The woman’s husband was African-American, but neither she nor her husband read Vibe or listened to rap
194. See sources cited supra note 193.
195. Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in
Name Only, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 4, 2010), https://on.wsj.com/2EBbSFh [https://
perma.cc/S74R-VJLF].
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Known as the Nielson PRIZM (Potential Rating Index by Zip Markets) system, these demographic categories were created by Claritas, Inc. before
the firm became a Nielson subsidiary in 2004 through a series of mergers and reorganizations. PRIZM uses census data, zip code clusters, and marketing surveys to
classify people into segments based on location, lifestyle, “lifestage,” and consumer
behavior. For example, customers in Nielson’s “White Picket Fence” category
tended to be homeowners, parents within the ages of 24 to 44, living in small cities
where the median household income was $53,901, and employed in white-collar or
service jobs.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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music.204 The inaccurate assumptions about the woman raises questions of how such behavioral proclivities were attributed to her
household and whether the flawed assumptions somehow prioritized the card products offered.205
Isolating sources of flawed demographic assumptions in a card
industry where online enrollment and spending continue to increase
is critically important.206 Online retail sales in the United States
exceeded $360 billion in 2016, $409 billion in 2017, and are on track
to surpass $461 billion in 2018.207 In 2017, consumers executed
$2.749 trillion in ACH internet-based payments, or a 12.7 percent
increase over 2016 figures.208 Upward trends in online purchases
are unfolding in a digital climate that promotes the convenience of
online payments most of us execute with little thought. Those
purchases, however, feed Big Data and the sophisticated learning
algorithms that support credit card issuance as well as other types
of underwriting.
The language and judicial treatment of ECOA further complicate any prospect of tackling algorithmically concealed racism. The
statute prohibits lenders from discriminating against credit applicants on the basis of age, religion, race, color, national origin, or
their status as recipients of public benefits. ECOA contains, however, no comparable provisions to those in the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act that require lenders to disclose the race of applicants and borrowers.209 ECOA’s lack of reporting requirements
undermines access to data that regulators might use to monitor the
presence of disparate impacts. The deficiency in mandatory reporting requirements also adds to judicial uncertainty as to whether discrimination claims are cognizable. The judicial uncertainty may
account for the paucity of Department of Justice enforcement actions.210 In fact, the Department did not file its first claim until
1999.211 In that case, the defendant-bank entered into a $1.5 mil204. Id.
205. Steel & Angwin, supra note 195.
206. CFPB, supra note 129, at 11.
207. Retail E-Commerce Sales in the United States from 2016 to 2022 (in Million U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://bit.ly/2sMlC9R [https://perma.cc/3N6UX8KJ].
208. ACH Payments in the U.S.–2017, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants,
Carpinteria, Cal.), May 2018, at 12, https://bit.ly/2RZuWQC [https://perma.cc/
X52Y-BALD].
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2018).
210. See, e.g., Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir.
2005).
211. See Complaint, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, No. 1:99-cv-00196SLR (D. Del. filed Mar. 29, 1999), https://bit.ly/2QEzLlK [https://perma.cc/B7NA-

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK201.txt

354

unknown

Seq: 48

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

23-JAN-19

14:56

[Vol. 123:307

lion settlement agreement with no acknowledgment of wrongdoing.212 Two subsequent claims resulted in similar outcomes.213
Notably, government investigations originating from the CFPB or
one of its predecessors gave rise to all three claims. The particular
source of the discrimination claims reinforces the notion that consumers are less likely to discern racially problematic lending patterns. To maintain industry practice secrecy, credit card issuers
support unsecured lending arrangements formed outside the purview of public recording systems. Such lending secrecy is similar to
that with mortgages or other forms of secured loans. ECOA’s regulatory framework constitutes a design weakness that perpetuates racial borrowing inequities because racially problematic underwriting
is likely to occur in plain sight and without detection. Under
ECOA, the regulatory framework is a rubric misaligned with the
algorithmic terrain. The recognition that ECOA effectively discourages discrimination claims warrants turning our attention to
potential impact on cardholder segmentation.
C. Algorithms, Bias, Segmentation, and Network Effects Reimagined
The analytical process to disentangle illegal treatments of race
from technologically aided consumer sorting is difficult. Algorithms add to the challenge by characterizing geo-demographic data
clusters as ostensibly neutral metrics that merely reflect societal
preferences and tastes. A clearer picture of these preferences
emerges when stripped of their neutral pretense. Nielson’s 66 categories are a taxonomy, where he assigns rankings to the entire population that range from the first place “Upper Crust” segment to
the last place “Low-Rise Living.”214 The labels and constituent descriptions are revealing insofar as they transmit degrees of desirability clearly traceable to structural inequality’s legacy. For
RDAA] (alleging Associates National Bank of Delaware subjected Hispanic borrowers to stricter underwriting standards and less favorable terms and conditions
than those applied to non-Hispanic borrowers).
212. See Settlement Agreement Between United States of America and Associates National Bank at 2, United States v. Assocs. Nat’l Bank, No. 1:99-cv-00196SLR (D. Del. filed Mar. 29, 1999), https://bit.ly/2GoAFOQ [https://perma.cc/
BZK6-A8L8].
213. See Settlement Agreement and Order, United States v. Fidelity Fed.
Bank, No. 1:02-CV-02-3906 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2002), https://bit.ly/2QZQuzz
[https://perma.cc/JP3H-U7MW]; see also Consent Order, United States v. Synchrony Bank, No. 2:14-CV-00454 (D. Utah filed June 27, 2014), https://bit.ly/
2rJs92y [https://perma.cc/5NUG-AU76].
214. PRIZM, SEGMENT SNAPSHOT DESCRIPTIONS, https://bit.ly/2S7HLsj
[https://perma.cc/9K8B-T3YP].

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK201.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 49

23-JAN-19

MODERN PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS

14:56

355

example, the 65th segment, labeled “Big City Blues,” contains the
following description:
With a population that’s 50 percent Latino, Big City Blues has
the highest concentration of Hispanic Americans in the nation.
But it’s also the multi-ethnic address for downscale Asian and
African-American households occupying older inner-city apartments. Concentrated in a handful of major metros, these young
singles and single-parent families face enormous challenges: low
incomes, uncertain jobs and modest educations. More than 40
percent haven’t finished high school.215

By contrast, the seventh place “Money & Brains” segment is
described this way:
The residents of Money & Brains seem to have it all: high incomes, advanced degrees and sophisticated tastes to match their
credentials. Many of these city-dwellers, predominantly white
with a high concentration of Asian Americans, are married
couples with few children who live in fashionable homes on
small, manicured lots.216

The descriptions use particular combinations of terms such as
“upper-class,” “affluent,” “diverse,” or “ethnic” in ways that are
not simply descriptive, but infused with value-laden assumptions:217
[W]hen segments are combined with both racial and class perceptions, the clusters may be over-generalized, fail to account for
eclectic combinations of preferences that might defy categorization. . . . [A]t the very least, clusters may be skewed by the
images of ourselves that are sold to us and arguably, as a result,
are coveted and absorbed.218

Credit card issuers use technologically enabled sorting based
on race and income alongside industry practices that were discussed
in Part II. The combination of sorting and industry practices reinforce and complement a wider competitive, aspirational, and consumptive ethos that pressures people to improve their
socioeconomic standing in relation to others. Industry practices
further reinforce and complement pressures to convey impressions
of class membership in a society that treats poverty as a moral failing—one often ascribed to racial minorities. When the industry en215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile: Thoughts on Race, Class,
Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 886 (2006).
218. Id. at 887.
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gages in technologically enabled sorting, poor racial minorities
carry the financial brunt of societal pressures to avoid appearing
poor.
The pressures, and thus the related costs, to avoid appearing
poor are omnipresent. For example, schools routinely shame children who cannot afford to pay for their lunch in the middle of the
day, despite mountains of research linking a child’s nutritional intake to his or her learning outcomes.219 Another example is the
subsets of evangelical Christianity that tout the so-called “prosperity gospel.” The prosperity gospel teaches Christians that God’s
most favored are blessed with material wealth—the inference being
that the poor are disfavored.220 Yet another example is the way
real estate websites use statistics about crime, school ratings, and
other social markers to steer prospective homebuyers to or away
from particular neighborhoods.221 Law schools and other professional programs ask prospective enrollees about their prior financial history.222 Additionally, employers will occasionally deny
employment opportunities to job applicants with poor credit
scores.223 The pressure to avoid the appearance of being poor compounds on those who incur huge debt to enter classic professions.
Most bear the additional burden of buying expensive business attire
out of occupational necessity, to “look the part,” and to assure colleagues they “fit in.” Finally, the law-enforcement system exacer219. See Melinda Anderson, What Do Unpaid Lunch Tabs Mean for
Schools?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2016), https://bit.ly/2mfnDIM [https://perma.cc/T4FNBA8T].
220. See Jacob M. Bass, The Sermon on the Mountain of Cash: How to Curtail
the Prosperity Scheme and Prevent Opportunists from Preying on Vulnerable Parishioners, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 147, 147–50 (2017) (discussing a Christian
movement that believes church donations will lead to God’s blessing); John Ehrett,
The Robber Baron’s Revenge: Law and Theology in the Shadow of Economic
Transition, 9 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 47, 67 (2016) (defining prosperity gospel as a
phenomenon that “draws a connection between material fortune and divine
favor”).
221. Sites like realtor.com allow prospective homebuyers to incorporate
crime rates, school quality, the availability of private schools, zip codes, and median home values, which can also serve as proxies for race.
222. Law school applicants are routinely asked for information they must also
provide to state law examiners prior to writing their bar examinations. This information often mirrors the kinds of disclosures required by the National Conference
of Bar Examiners. Their sample application asks if candidates have ever had a
credit card revoked outside the context of bankruptcy. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS, SAMPLE CHARACTER & FITNESS APPLICATION, https://
bit.ly/2GoUju7 [https://perma.cc/9NMJ-AVRF].
223. See Dona DeZube, How Your Financial Past Can Hurt Your Job Search,
MONSTER, https://bit.ly/2ngs995 [https://perma.cc/BK5Y-QP9L] (offering guidance
to job applicants that may have to disclose credit and financial information to prospective employers).
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bates the societal pressures to avoid the appearance of being poor.
The law-enforcement system has a long history of ensnaring African-American men, removing them from the economy, and using
records of prior criminal involvement to bar reentry into the
workplace.
Dominant societal perceptions of poor people of color further
complicate this demographic’s relationship to credit card debt. The
narrative that African-Americans are irresponsible spenders is a
longstanding stereotype. This trope is a variant on the Victorian
view that poor people are predisposed to making unwise choices.
The narrative lives on in perceptions of how poor people spend
their money. If they would just “make better choices,” the argument goes, the poor could lift themselves out of poverty. Against
the backdrop of these narratives, scholarly treatment of spending
tendencies among poor people of color is mixed. While some peerreviewed research acknowledges higher rates of consumption
spending among black and Hispanic consumers than whites, the difference appears to reflect status signaling.224 The research suggests
that status signaling is a pattern that disappears among lower-income earners who demonstrate the behavior equally to higher-income earners.225
African-Americans face additional pressures from certain
quarters within their own communities, where expectations born of
respectability politics operate to shame those considered predisposed to wasteful spending.226 In what became infamously known
as the “Pound Cake Speech,” comedian and actor Bill Cosby admonished segments of the black community for not living up to the
ideals of the civil rights movement.227 He charged that “[t]he lower
economic and lower middle economic people are not holding their
end in this deal.”228 He further attacked African-American naming
practices, shamed single mothers, overstated high school dropout
224. See generally Kerwin Kofi Charles et al., Conspicuous Consumption and
Race, 124 Q.J. ECON. 425 (2009).
225. Id.
226. Equity-seeking populations will engage in respectability politics by internally pressuring members to exhibit behaviors thought to align with those of mainstream society, as an alternative to challenging society to treat them more
equitably. For a recent discussion, see Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman,
Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of OfficerInvolved Civilian Deaths: An Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 541,
543 (2016).
227. See Bill Cosby, Address at the NAACP’ on the 50th Anniversary of
Brown v. Board of Education (May 17, 2004), in AMERICANRHETORIC.COM,
https://bit.ly/2PLHbhK [https://perma.cc/PDB7-S7XZ]fcns].
228. Id. at 1.
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rates, and misrepresented levels of black incarceration.229 Critiquing black parenting practices, Cosby went on to say, “they’re buying
things for the kid—$500 sneakers—for what? They won’t buy or
spend $250 on Hooked on Phonics.”230 The ideological underpinnings of this narrative reveal longstanding class divides within the
African-American community.231 Cosby firmly declared himself to
be in the affluent camp, reportedly waxing nostalgic about segregation’s ancillary benefits:
When restaurants, laundries, hotels, theaters, groceries, and
clothing stores were segregated, black people owned and ran
their own. . . . Such successes provided jobs and strength to black
economic well-being. They also gave black people that gratifying
sense of an interdependent community.232

Class and race remain closely interrelated determinants of
where and how Americans live.233 But recent data from the Pew
Research Center suggests a growing racial wealth gap among middle-class households.234 While the overall racial wealth gap shrank
from 2013 to 2016, the median wealth of white households was ten
times that of black households and eight times that of Hispanic
households.235 Middle- and lower-income households are still recovering from the Great Recession, which halved wealth in white
lower-income homes.236 Significantly, black and Hispanic middleincome households also saw a 50 percent drop in wealth.237
Pew’s data also revealed racial gaps in wealth within income
groups, with white families having four times the wealth of black
families in the lower- and middle-income households.238 The share
of families with zero net worth or in debt reflect continued reces229. Id. at 1–2.
230. Id. at 2.
231. Ta-Nehisi Coates, ‘This Is How We Lost To The White Man’, ATLANTIC
(May 2008), https://bit.ly/2SWui6y [https://perma.cc/959F-2CXH].
232. BILL COSBY & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, COME ON, PEOPLE: ON THE PATH
FROM VICTIMS TO VICTORS 37 (2007).
233. The widely documented scholarly discussion of America’s racial wealth
gap is simply too vast to fully capture here. See Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, How Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession,
by Race, Ethnicity and Income, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://pewrsr.ch/
2z5kgY0 [https://perma.cc/BV96-FEJP]; MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY
AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).
234. See Kochhar & Cilluffo, supra note 233.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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sionary stress on household finances.239 Overall, black and Hispanic families are more likely to experience zero net worth or debt
related to lingering recessionary stress than white families.240
While the share of lower-income black and Hispanic families with
zero or negative net worth decreased, it went up across the middle
class.241 Black families showed the smallest net worth increase.
Socioeconomic hierarchies drive the credit card industry’s marketing, underwriting, enrollment, and contractual arrangements.
The socioeconomic hierarchies produce two kinds of network effects that function concurrently to the detriment of minorities and
the poor. Firstly, because merchants bear system costs and historical limits, merchants pass those costs on to consumers in the form
of surcharges outside the framework of private and public law. Different borrowers have different financial capacity to refuse those
surcharges. Whereas affluent customers have more economic freedom to determine whether to pay credit card surcharges at points of
sale, poorer subsistence borrowers may feel compelled to pay such
fees to access urgently needed debt. Subsistence borrowers’ lack of
choice regarding point-of-sale surcharges underwrites the first kind
of socioeconomic hierarchy embedded in the normative model of
network effects.
The second socioeconomic hierarchy embedded in the normative model of network effects exploits poorer borrowers to benefit
wealthier borrowers. In the normative model of network effects,
consumers jockey for coveted places within a stratified space where
some enjoy conferral of favored status at the expense of others.
Generally, wealthier consumers want to accumulate airline points,
“cash back” rewards, and other perks. The wealthier consumer’s
interests prompt their enrollment in card programs that generate no
revenue for issuers. Issuers cannot sustain these programs without
capitalizing on the borrowing patterns of poorer borrowers, who
are likely to carry a balance. The resultant network effect is that
poorer cardholders supply the larger share of issuer-side operating
costs to the benefit of their wealthier counterparts. Card networks
that embrace technologies embedded with human bias may reinforce or worsen extant discriminatory practices rooted in the actuarial and behavioral sciences.
The card industry seized on the compounded effect of legal,
social, and economic forces afflicting many poor people. Many
poor people have anxieties that leave them especially vulnerable to
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
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debt arrangements that temporarily sustain economic survival at
the potential cost of longer-term debt. Marketing strategies tout
credit cards as convenient short-term financial fixes. They facilitate
hyperbolic discounting and exploit other forms of underestimation
bias that lie at the heart of why payment choice is especially complicated for racial minorities. The current economy permits stereotypes to bleed into Big Data and mix with actuarial metrics.
Racially problematic informational processes reside in technological landscapes and beyond reach of conventional regulation. To
make informed market decisions, consumers need a regulatory
framework that broadens the existing range of institutional disclosures under fair lending laws. There remains no feasible way to cast
a light on the degree to which cardholders are unwittingly complicit
in atomized forms of discrimination at enrollment or at points of
sale when choosing cashless forms of payment.
CONCLUSION
While the ethics of enrollment practices and disputes over
surcharges may seem unrelated, both coalesce around a hierarchy
of cardholders. A decade ago, one scholar observed that low mortgage rates pressured lending institutions to rely on revenues from
interchange fees.242 As reward programs became more popular,
growth in revenues from interchange fees outpaced profits from interest on unpaid credit card balances.243 Initially conceived as private contractual arrangements and reborn as public law, surcharge
bans preserved revenue flows by limiting merchants’ capacity to reduce their payment processing costs. Hoping constitutional law
would provide relief from these payment processing costs,
merchants also forayed into the public law arena. While the Supreme Court has stopped short of settling the substantive First
Amendment arguments, a successful challenge could present an opportunity to test the behavioral theories that historically spurred
card issuers to oppose surcharges.
This Article predicts that lending practices and surcharges will
have the combined effect of supporting cardholder stratification.
Further, this Article argues that the stratification will exacerbate
racially problematic network effects extant in the relationship between wealthier cardholders and their less affluent counterparts.
Aided by algorithms and behavioral theory, the credit card industry
will continue to enroll subsistence borrowers into programs where
242. See Levitin, Priceless, supra note 7, at 1338.
243. See id.
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the subsistence borrowers are likely to carry a balance. Subsistence
borrowers’ balances generate interest and late payment fees. Subsistence borrowers tend to have overconfidence in their capacity to
manage credit card debt in the face of pressure to meet urgent financial needs. The industry uses the subsistence borrowers’ overconfidence as a source of profit, to service their debt and to
generate additional revenues not available from affluent
consumers.
Merchant surcharges will further entrench cardholder segmentation in two respects. First, merchants will be free to dissuade the
use of high-cost card products. Second, the poor may face predatory fees under the guise of reduced payment processing costs. Although the industry’s approach to surcharges has been grounded in
behavioral theories of strategic deterrence, surcharge fees simply
place desperate borrowers in much the same position as those
forced to use so-called “pay day” lenders. Poverty’s effects can
complicate the autonomous exercise of choices poor people make
as consumers because poverty forces those under constant socioeconomic strain to choose from a range of bad options. Being poor
preoccupies the mind and consumes “substantial attentional resources.”244 People living in poverty must necessarily cope with
competing claims for limited financial resources. Economic stressors cast a pall over the allocation of cognitive resources informing
choices made in the marketplace where urgent financial needs outstrip available finances.
What options exist for socially conscious consumers who may
see appeal in rewards programs but feel uneasy about hurting their
fellow consumers? How do lending institutions design equitable
underwriting paradigms that appropriately identify risky borrowers
without masking biases harmful to equity? We all make purchases.
The manner of payment concurrently expresses who we are as social participants and supplies information to technocapitalists capable of using the information to profit from socioeconomic
inequality.
Perhaps it is time for critical race theorists to deepen their
foray into the discourse surrounding network effects. Scholars
should broaden critical race theory’s contours to account for technology’s relationship with race. The relationship between race and
technology did not inform the original purpose of card networks’
formation when such cashless payments were less common. But the
244. Eldar Shafir, Poverty and Civil Rights: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2014).
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theory of network effects might be put to good use if equitably
commandeered by a broad, interdisciplinary group of experts in
law, economics, banking, computing, and information sciences.
This Article aims to promote such an exercise by seeking out assistance from experts interested in blunting the effects of algorithmically framed bias in the marketplace. Poverty complicates
subsistence spenders’ ability to simply “make better choices.” Reliance on debiasing, or cognitively altering a decision-maker’s biases,
simply diverts attention from the more pervasive and pernicious determinants of racism and “poverty trapping” people in economic
distress.245

245. Cf. David Arnott, Cognitive Biases and Decision Support Systems Development: A Design Science Approach, 16 INFO. SYSS. J. 55, 62 (2006) (addressing
negative side effects of debiasing).

